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This thesis contains several lines of research conducted during my four years at
the European University Institute. It deals with two distinct topics in the area of
recursive economies, developed in three chapters.
The ¯rst chapter considers a general class of recursive models in which inequality
constraints pose a challenging problem: Standard Dynamic Programming techniques
often necessitate a non established di®erentiability of the value function, while Eu-
ler equation based techniques have problematic or unknown convergence properties.
The chapter aims to resolve parts of these two concerns: An envelope theorem is pre-
sented that establishes the di®erentiability of any element in the convergent sequence
of approximate value functions when inequality constraints may bind. As a corollary,
convergence of an iterative procedure on the Euler equation, usually referred to as
time iteration, is ascertained. This procedure turns out to be very convenient from a
computational perspective; dynamic economic problems with inequality constraints
can be solved reliably and extremely e±ciently by exploiting the theoretical insights
provided.
The second chapter studies a model of optimal redistribution policies in which
agents face unemployment risk and in which savings may provide partial self-insurance.
Moral hazard arises as job search e®ort is unobservable. The optimal redistribution
policies provide new insights into how an unemployment insurance scheme should be
designed: First, the unemployment insurance policy is recursive in an agent's wealth
level, and thus independent of the duration of the unemployment spell. Second, the
level of bene¯t payments is negatively related to the agent's asset position. The rea-
son behind the latter result is twofold; in addition to the ¯rst-order insurance e®ect
of wealth, an increase in non-labor income (wealth) ampli¯es the opportunity cost of
employment and thus reduces the agent's incentive to search for a job.
7




During unemployment the agent decumulates assets and the sequence of bene¯t
payments is observationally increasing - a result that stands in sharp contrast with
previous studies.
The third chapter studies a very similar model to that explored in Chapter 2.
In contrast, however, I impose a liquidity constraint that limits agents' possibility
to borrow. As will be shown, this additional constraint will have salient quantita-
tive implication on how an optimal unemployment insurance programme should be
designed. As in the second chapter, the optimal unemployment insurance scheme is
recursive in an agent's asset position and her past and current employment status.
As a consequence, a liquidity constrained agent receives a constant °ow of bene¯t
payments throughout the unemployment spell. In the quantitative analysis I show
that the e®ect of a liquidity constraint is of high importance: A constrained agent
with zero liquid wealth ought to receive bene¯ts payments three times higher than
that received by an agent with wealth equal to one months labor income; twenty
times higher than that received by an agent with wealth equal to three months labor
income; and one hundred times higher compared to an agent with savings equal to
twelve months of labor income (US median labor income to wealth ratio).




Inequality Constraints in Recursive Economies
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1. Introduction
Dynamic models with inequality constraints are of considerable interest to many
economists. In microeconomics, and in particular in consumption theory, the impor-
tance of liquidity constraints is widely recognized (e.g. Deaton, 1991). With respect
to macroeconomic models of heterogeneous agents, a debt limit is generally a nec-
essary condition for the existence of an ergodic set (see for instance Ljungqvist and
Sargent (2004), Aiyagari (1994) and Krusell and Smith (1998)), and models with
limited enforcement have recently proven to provide a realistic description of inter-
national co-movements (Kehoe and Perri, 2002). Additionally, inequality constraints
may convey substantial empirical relevance; for instance, employment laws may pro-
hibit ¯ring, lending contracts may prevent bank runs. Foreign direct investments,
minimum wages, price regulations, etc. are all examples of potentially binding in-
equality constraints. Nonetheless, solving dynamic economic models with inequality
constraints is generally perceived as challenging: Methods that can handle inequality
constraints with ease, generally su®er from the curse of dimensionality, while meth-
ods that can moderate this curse have di±culties dealing with such constraints. This
paper shows the conditions under which the n-step value function for a dynamic
problem with inequality constraints is di®erentiable, and utilizes this result to show
how a Euler equation based method can deal with inequality constraints in an easily
implementable, e±cient and accurate manner.1
In the context of discretized Dynamic Programming, dealing with inequality con-
straints is generally straightforward; the state space is trivially delimited such that
any inequality constraint cannot be violated. Nevertheless, discretized Dynamic Pro-
gramming severely su®ers from the curse of dimensionality. To circumvent this dif-
¯culty, researchers have on many instances relied upon continuous state approxima-
tion methods.
2 These procedures generally work well for interior problems where it
is known that the value function is di®erentiable, which is commonly a necessary
condition to recover the equilibrium policy function. However, given that Benveniste
and Scheinkman's (1979) envelope theorem assumes interiority, this result does not
1The \n-step value function" refers to any element in the sequence fvngn2N.
2Or, equivalently, \Parameterized Dynamic Programming".




extend to models where inequality constraints may occasionally bind. In the liter-
ature, many researchers have chosen to ignore this problem and to proceed as the
value function is known to be di®erentiable even when such constraints are present.
An appealing approach to deal with inequality constraints in dynamic models
is to operate on the Euler equation. Christiano and Fisher (2000) show that such
constraints can be dealt with in a straightforward way when preferably using the
parameterized expectations algorithm developed by den Haan and Marcet (1990), or
a version thereof.
3 However, when using such Euler equation based methods, conver-
gence is far from certain and, without an educated initial guess for the equilibrium
policy function, convergence may indeed often fail.
4
This paper addresses these concerns. It will be shown that under certain condi-
tions, any element of the sequence of value functions de¯ned by value function iter-
ation is di®erentiable when a general class of inequality constraints are considered.
Moreover, analytical expressions of their respective derivatives will be presented.
By exploiting these theoretical insights, an iterative procedure on the Euler equa-
tion, commonly known as time iteration, is derived. Given that this procedure is
equivalent to value function iteration it is, under mild initial conditions, a globally
convergent method of ¯nding the equilibrium functions for recursively de¯ned, Pareto
optimal problems. Due to the concavity of the problem, this turns out to be a very
convenient and e±cient technique from a computational perspective.
The outline of the paper is the following: Section 2 states and proves the paper's
main propositions. Section 3 shows through three examples how the results in section
2 may be implemented in practice. Section 4 concludes.
2. Theory
In this section two central propositions will be presented: Proposition 1 establishes
the conditions under which any element of the convergent sequence of approximate
value functions, fvngn2N, is di®erentiable. After de¯ning time iteration as a particular
3See McGrattan (1996) for an alternative Euler equation based technique that utilizes the notion
of a \penalty function".
4In Christiano and Fisher (2000), a log linearized version of the model is solved and used as an
initial guess for the equilibrium functions.
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iterative procedure on the Euler equation, Proposition 2 will establish that the se-
quence of policy functions generated by this method converges to the unique solution.
This paper looks for solutions for problems that may be framed on the basis of









Where x 2 X is the endogenous state, z 2 Z is the exogenous state with a law of
motion determined by the stationary transition function Q. The following is assumed:
(i) X is a convex Borel set in R` with Borel subsets X, and Z is a compact
Borel set in Rk with Borel subsets Z. Denote the (measurable) product
space of (X;X) and (Z;Z) as (S;S).
(ii) The transition function, Q : Z £ Z ! [0;1], has the Feller property.5
(iii) The feasibility correspondence ¡ : X £ Z ! 2X is, nonempty, compact-
valued, and continuous. Moreover, the set A = f(y;x) 2 X £ X : y 2
¡(x;z)g is convex in x, for all z 2 Z.
(iv) The return function F(¢;¢;z) : A ! R is, once continuously di®erentiable,
strictly concave and bounded on A for all z 2 Z.
(v) The discount factor, ¯, is in the interval (0;1).
It is important to note that the above de¯nition of the feasibility correspondence
includes the possibility of inequality constraints.
If v0 is (weakly) concave and the above assumptions hold, the following statements
are true for any n 2 N (Section 9.2 in Stokey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989):

















converge pointwise (in the sup-norm) to the unique ¯xed points v and g.6
(ii) v and vn are strictly concave.
(iii) g and gn are continuous functions.
5Alternatively one may assume that Z is countable and that Z is the power set of Z; Z = 2Z.
6Where g is the argmax of (1).




For subsequent reference, the following additional assumptions will be used
Assumption 1. The feasibility correspondence can be formulated as
¡(x;z) = fy 2 X : mj(x;y;z) · 0;j = 1;:::;rg
and the functions mj(x;y;z), j = 1;:::;r, are, once continuously di®erentiable in x
and y, and convex in y.
Assumption 2. Linear Independence Constraint Quali¯cation (LICQ): The Ja-
cobian of the p binding constraints has full (row) rank; i.e. rank(Jm) = p.
Assumption 3. The following hold
(i) ¡(x;z) ½ int(X) or
(ii) X is compact and gn(x;z) 2 int(X), for all n 2 N.
Note that Assumption 2 implies that there exists a ^ y such that mj(x; ^ y;z) < 0,
for all x, z and j (Slater's Condition). Moreover, part (i) in Assumption 3 implies
part (ii), but the converse is generally not true.
De¯ne the operator T on C1(S), the space of bounded, strictly concave once









Before moving ahead, it is important to note that under the above additional assump-



















where L(x;y;z;¹) is a saddle function (see for instance Rockafellar, 1970).
The ultimate goal of this section is to show that time iteration yields a convergent
sequence of policy functions. The following de¯nition of time iteration will be used.7
7This de¯nition covers of course the special cases of time iteration discussed in, for instance,
Judd (1998), and Coleman (1990). As far as the author is aware, there has been no application of
\time iteration" that has not complied with this de¯nition.
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Definition 1. Denote the partial derivatives of F and mj with respect to the ith
element of y as Fi(x;y;z) and mj;i(x;y;z), respectively. Then, time iteration is the
iterative procedure that ¯nds the sequence fhn(x;z)g1
n=0 as y = hn+1(x;z) such that

















Notwithstanding the seemingly esoteric notation, time iteration can be thought
of as using the Euler equation to ¯nd today's optimal policy, hn+1, given the policy
of tomorrow, hn.
In order to verify that this procedure yields a sequence of policy functions con-
verging to g, the following will be shown: Proposition 1 ascertains that the value
functions vn, all n 2 N, are di®erentiable and, by exploiting this ¯nding, Proposition
2 will establish the desired result.
The following lemma is necessary for Proposition 1.
Lemma 1. The minimizer, ¹(x;z), of (3) is a continuous function with respect
to x and z.
Proof. By the de¯nition of a saddle function, the fact that ¹ ¸ 0 and mj(x; ^ y;z) <
0, for all x, z and j, it follows that
(Tf)(x;z) ¸ L(x; ^ y;z;¹





0) ¡ ¹j(x;z)mj(x; ^ y;z)
Which further implies that
¹j(x;z) · ¹ ¹j ´ max
x2X





Denote ~ g as ~ g(x;z;¹) = argmaxy2X L(x;y;z;¹). By Berge's Theorem of the Maxi-
mum, L(x; ~ g(x;z;¹);z;¹) is a continuous function in ¹. Hence, the set of minimizers




is an upper hemicontinuous correspondence in x and z. Assumptions 2 and 3, ensures
that ¹(x;z) is single valued and, consequently, a continuous function in x and z. ¤




Proposition 1. The n-step value function, vn, is (once) continuously di®eren-
tiable with respect to x 2 int(X) and its partial derivatives are given by




for i = 1;:::;`.
Proof. It is su±cient to show that T : C1(S) ! C1(S).
De¯ne the saddle function










Pick an x 2 int(X) and an x0 in a neighborhood, N"(x), such that x0
i > xi and x0
j = xj
8j 6= i. Here, xi denotes the ith element of the vector x. For notational convenience,
denote the policy and multiplier functions from (3) as g, ¹ and g0, ¹0 for (x;z) and
(x0;z) respectively.











0;z;¹) · L(x;g;z;¹) · L(x;g;z;¹
0)













By Lemma 1 and the results on page 12, the functions g and ¹ are continuous.
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Assuming, instead, that x0








If v0 is a weakly concave and di®erentiable function, the desired result is achieved. ¤
Note that since the space C1(S) is not complete in the sup-norm, Proposition 1
does not imply that the limiting value function, v, is di®erentiable. Moreover, in the
proposition above, strict concavity of the problem and full rank of Jm is assumed.
This simpli¯es the proof given in Corollary 5, p. 597, in Milgrom and Segal (2002),
which essentially is equivalent for x 2 (0;1).
The ¯nal proposition will show that the sequence of policy functions obtained by
time iteration converges to the true policy function.
Proposition 2. The function y = hn+1(x;z) that solves


























Proof. Due to the stated assumptions, a su±cient condition for a maximum is
a saddle point of the Lagrangian









By Proposition 1, the value function vn(y;z0) is di®erentiable and by Assumption 3,
given minimizers ¹n+1, su±cient conditions for a saddle point are thus8









8Assuming that di®erentiation under the integral is legitimate.




for i = 1;:::;`. By Proposition 1, this can be rewritten as

















Due to strict concavity the solution is unique and hn+1(x;z) = gn+1(x;z), which
concludes the proof. ¤
Since it is known that for all " > 0 there exist an Ns such that sups jg(s)¡gn(s)j <
" for all n ¸ Ns, Proposition 2 states that sups jg(s) ¡ hn(s)j < " for all n ¸ Ns.
Hence, the sequence fhngn2N converges to the unique function g.9
Lastly, there are two additional remarks to be made: Firstly, gn ! g implies
that Fi(x;gn(x;z);z) ! Fi(x;g(x;z);z). As long as mj(x;y;z) = mj(y;z), this
further implies that vi;n(x;z) ! Fi(x;g(x;z);z).10 Hence, if convergence of gn is
uniform, then v(x;z) is, under these additional conditions, indeed di®erentiable and
its derivative is given by Fi(x;g(x;z);z). In fact, this result holds under weaker
assumptions than previously stated; undeniably, LICQ is dispensable.
Secondly, a su±cient condition for v(x;z) to be di®erentiable in the more general
setting, is that ¹(s) is unique for each s 2 S.11
2.1. Discussion. A natural question to ask is how the propositions above are
useful in the sense of ¯nding the solution to an in¯nite horizon problem. Indeed, what
has been proven is an equivalence between value function and time iteration and, as
such, neither method has any advantage over the other. From a strict theoretical
viewpoint this is certainly true. However, it should be noted that very few problems
actually have an analytical solution, and a numerical approximation to the solution
is commonly required. When such procedures are necessary, the propositions above
can be used extensively if inequality constraints are present.
9If X is compact, Ns is independent of s.
10Such constraints, (endogenous) state independent constraints, corresponds, for instance, to
debt limits.
11If the dual objective function is strictly convex in ¹ (it is known to be weakly convex), then
¹(s) is unique for each s 2 S.
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To appreciate this line of reasoning, note that in many applications Dynamic
Programming relies upon a discretized state space, and such a formulation makes
any inequality constraint easy to implement. Nonetheless, to achieve high accuracy
the discretization must be made on a very ¯ne grid and this causes the procedure
to su®er severely from the curse of dimensionality. To avoid the curse of dimen-
sionality, scholars have relied upon sophisticated approximation methods to enhance
accuracy without markedly increasing computer time.
12 Generally, such approxima-
tion methods use the derivative of a numerically approximated value function to ¯nd
the sequence of policy functions. Clearly, Proposition 1 con¯rms that such continuous
state methods will converge to the true solution under a wide set of circumstances.
Moreover, when numerical approximations are used, there may be signi¯cant dif-
ferences between value function- and time iteration, and on some occasions there are
reasons to favor the latter: Depending on the character of the problem, the policy
function might behave in a less complicated way than the value function, and hence
might be more straightforward to approximate. More importantly, given that the de-
rivative of the value function is usually needed to ¯nd the policy function, an accurate
approximation of its slope is as important as its level. As a consequence, not only
are more data points needed for the approximation, but the choice of approximation
method is also restricted. This restriction generally causes Dynamic Programming to
su®er more from the curse of dimensionality than time iteration.
13
As a ¯nal remark it ought to be mentioned that time iteration can be implemented
using the standard timing convention, or the timing convention de¯ned in Carroll
(2005). Hence, problems within the preceding framework can thus be solved extremely
e±ciently with sustained convergence features.
12For instance, Judd and Solnick (1994) show, in the case of the standard neoclassical growth
model, that using a grid with 12 nodes and applying a shape-preserving spline performs as well as
a discretized technique with 1200 nodes.
13Approximation methods that are capable of accurately approximating both the level and the
slope of a function - certain classes of ¯nite element methods - are not even theoretically developed
to deal with high dimensions. Thus, time iteration is the only available technique for reliably solving
high-dimensional nonlinear problems.





This section will provide three examples of problems with inequality constraints
where time iteration is applicable. The examples are variations of the in¯nite horizon
neoclassical growth model and are chosen on the basis that they represent a large
class of models used in the literature. For each respective model, the underlying
assumptions required for the results in section 2 will be explicitly veri¯ed. In addition,
the possible caveats and violations to Assumptions 2 and 3 will be explored.
It is not the purpose of this paper to establish the accuracy or e±ciency of various
algorithms by solving large scale Dynamic Programming problems. However, since
the ¯rst example presented below allows for a closed form solution, an accuracy ver-
i¯cation is indeed easily carried out and will thus be presented.
The economies are comprised by an in¯nite number of ex ante homogenous agents
of measure one. The agents maximize their utility by choosing a stochastic consump-
tion process that has to satisfy some feasibility restrictions. In general, the problem












0 2 K : mj(k;k
0;z) · 0;j = 1:::rg
Where y(k;z) ¡ k0 denotes consumption, k denotes capital, y is some function de-
termining income and z denotes some stochastic element. Naturally, it is assumed
that u, ¯, K, Z, Q and m ful¯ll the assumptions stated on page 12. Moreover, it is
assumed that u(c) = lim°!¾
c1¡°
1¡° , 1 > ¾ ¸ 1, that y(k;z) is concave in k and, unless
something else is speci¯cally stated, that y is such that for all z 2 Z there exist an
^ k > 0 such that k · y(k;z) · ^ k, all 0 · k · ^ k, and y(k;z) < k, all k > ^ k. As in most
of the neoclassical literature it is assumed that y somehow depends on the function
f(k;h;z) = zk®h1¡®, for ® 2 (0;1). Labor, h, is assumed throughout to be supplied
inelastically and is normalized to unity.
3.1. An analytical example. The purpose of this example is to show how the
results from Corollary 1 and Propositions 1 and 2 work in a setting with a closed
form solution.
It is assumed that ¾ = 1, y(k) = k®, K = [k;k], m1(k;k0) = b ¡ k0, m2(k;k0) =
k0 ¡ k® and ® 2 (0;1). The economic model is hence characterized by the Bellman
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The model is the deterministic neoclassical growth model with full depreciation and
logarithmic utility, with an additional constraint on capital holdings. As long as k < b
and k > 1 = ^ k, Assumption 3 is guaranteed to hold. Note that the speci¯c choice
of utility function together with the additional assumption that 0 < b1=® < k will
ensure that k0 ¡k® · 0 never is breached. Hence, without violating Assumption 3, it
is possible to reduce the correspondence to
¡(k) = fk
0 2 K : b ¡ k
0 · 0g
By construction, Assumption 2 will hold. To eliminate uninteresting cases it is as-




Under the above conditions the results on page 12 hold, and the problem can be
solved with value function iteration. Assume for the sake of simplicity that (b=¯)1=® <









1¡¯ , corresponds to the time iteration step of ¯nding k0 = g1(k)
such that
1





for g0(k) = ¯k®.14 Since, the problem itself is strictly concave, it is possible to ignore
the multiplier: The policy function from solving this equation is accordingly given by
g1(k) = maxf
®¯
1¡¯+®¯k®;bg. Let v and v denote the value functions when the agent is
and is not constrained respectively. Hence
v1(k) = ®
1 ¡ ¯ + ®¯
1 ¡ ¯
lnk + A1; v1(k) = ln(k
® ¡ b) + ¯v0(b)















14Note that v0(k) =
ln(k
®¡g0(k))
1¡¯ . Moreover, g0 is a feasible policy for all k 2 K. Feasibility of
g0 is not a necessary requirement, but is merely used for the sake of simplicity.




The value function, v1, is consequently di®erentiable if, and only if, v0
1(k) = v0
1(k) at
k such that b =
®¯
























(1 ¡ ¯)((®¯)n¡1 ¡ 1) + (®¯)n¡1(®¯ ¡ 1)





(1 ¡ ¯)((®¯)n ¡ 1) + (®¯)n(®¯ ¡ 1)
(1 ¡ ¯)(®¯ ¡ 1)
+ An
vn(k) = ln(k
® ¡ b) + ¯vn¡1(b)
















1¡®¯ ln(®¯) + ln(1 ¡ ®¯)
1 ¡ ¯
v(k) = ln(k
® ¡ b) + ¯v(b)














Since the problem allows for an analytical solution, accuracy of various numerical
algorithms can be assessed straightforwardly. Table 1 lists the numerical results of
15Equivalently, one could exploit the, ex ante known, directional di®erentiability of v1(k) and
show that v0(k;¡1) = ¡v0(k;1), 8k 2 int(K); i.e. that the left and right derivative of v1(k) coincides
at all interior points of K.
16Clearly, the complete sequence of multipliers, f¹ng1
n=1, could be recovered in a similar fashion.
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Table 1.1. Performance of Algorithmsa
Value Iteration Time Iteration
Algorithm #1 #2 #3 #4
N 500 1000 20 20
Accuracy 5.3e-3 3.3e-3 5.8e-4 2.9e-6
ree 4.2e-3 2.1e-3 1.2e-3 3.2e-5
cpu-time 72 295 0.01 0.02
Remark Discrete grid Linear Spline
aAccuracy refers to the maximum absolute percentage error of the policy function in terms
of capital. ree refers to the maximum relative Euler equation errors de¯ned in Judd (1998).
Computer time is denoted in seconds, Linear and (cubic) Spline refer to the interpolation
method used for the equilibrium functions, and N denotes the number of nodes in the grid.
applying discretized value function iteration and time iteration to the model with











Figure 1.1. Policy functions for Algorithm #1 and #3.
advantage of time iteration is here quite clear; time iteration outperforms value func-
tion iteration in both norms, using a very coarse grid and in a fraction of the time.
The advantage of time iteration is further illuminated by Figure 1.1 where the policy
functions recovered from the procedures are graphed close to the debt limit. Even at
the binding point, time iteration performs extremely well.




3.2. Irreversible investment. (Christiano and Fisher, 2000) Irreversibility of
investment in the neoclassical growth model is an important example given that it
captures the problem of state dependent inequality constraints.
For this economy it is assumed that y(k;z) = f(k;z) + (1 ¡ ±)k, K = [k;k],
m1(k;k0;z) = (1 ¡ ±)k ¡ k0 and m2(k;k0;z) = k0 ¡ y(k;z). Moreover, markets for













0 2 K : (1 ¡ ±)k ¡ k
0 · 0;k
0 ¡ y(k;z) · 0g
In the previous example, it was possible to use an unbounded return function since the
\borrowing constraint" together with restrictions on the income function generated a
natural boundedness of the problem. However, in this formulation it is not possible to
impose a similar (debt) constraint, since such a restriction would clearly interfere with
the irreversibility constraint on investment and hence violate Assumption 2. As an
alternative it will be assumed ex ante that there exist an " > 0 such that for all z 2 Z,
n 2 N, gn(";z) > "; that is, a lower interiority of gn(k;z) is ex ante assumed for all
k;z and n.17 By the de¯nition of ^ k on page 19, the set of maintainable capital stocks
are thus given by K = [";^ k] and, given the speci¯c choice of the utility function, the
feasibility correspondence can be reformulated as ¡(k;z) = fk0 2 K : (1¡±)k¡k0 · 0g
without violating Assumption 3.











converges to v. By Proposition 2 and for a given ¹n+1(k;z), this procedure reduces
to ¯nding k0 = gn+1(k;z) such that
u
0(y(k;z) ¡ k















As can be seen from (4), the multiplier from the previous iteration is in the expectation
term. This indicates the presence of a state dependent constraint.
17Naturally, such a conjecture needs to be veri¯ed when solving the model.
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Although it is necessary to ¯nd both a policy function and a multiplier at each it-
eration, this is a trivial task. Since the problem itself is strictly concave, it is possible
to ignore ¹n+1 in (4) and ¯nd the function ^ gn+1 that solves the (reduced) equation.
The true policy function gn+1 can then be recovered as gn+1 = maxf^ gn+1;(1 ¡ ±)kg
and ¹n+1 is merely the residual in (4) when gn+1 is inserted into the equation.
For a parameterization given by, ® = 0:3, ¯ = 1:03¡1=4, ± = 0:02, ¾ = 1, Z =
exp(f0:23;¡0:23g), and Q(z;z0) = 1=2 for all (z;z0) pairs, the solution is depicted in
Figure 1.2. Figure 1.2 illustrates how distinctly the procedure captures the Kuhn-
Tucker condition of ¹(k;z)m1(k;k0;z) = 0. The Matlab program for this model,
















Figure 1.2. Investment function and multiplier for the model with
irreversible investment.
presented in Appendix A, clearly illustrates the simplicity of the procedure.
3.3. Incomplete markets. (Aiyagari, 1994) Standard models with incomplete
market are relevant for the procedure proposed in this paper since the assumption of
risk-free borrowing induces a debt limit as a necessary condition for the characteri-
zation of the economy to be valid.
It is assumed that y(k;z) = wz+(1+r)k, K = [k;k], Z is countable, m1(k;k0;z) =
¡Á ¡ k0 and, as before, m2(k;k0;z) = k0 ¡ y(k;z). Here z denotes an uninsurable
idiosyncratic component; markets are incomplete. However, there is no aggregate
risk in the economy. Moreover, w and r are given by fh(~ k;h) and 1 + fk(~ k;h) ¡ ±
respectively. ~ k represents the aggregate capital stock in the economy and, as be-
fore, h represent the employment rate, normalized to unity. The problem is thus
















0 2 K : ¡Á ¡ k
0 · 0;k
















Where ¸(k;z) denotes the (stationary) distribution of asset holdings and employment
status.
Note that y(k;z) does not ful¯ll the desired properties to ensure an upper bound
on the endogenous state space (as stated on page 19). However, as noted in Aiyagari
(1994), for all z 2 Z, there exist a k¤ such that, for all k ¸ k¤, k0 · k. In order to
ensure that Assumption 3 holds, set k > k¤ and k < ¡Á < wz + k(1 + r), where
z = inf Z. By again exploiting the properties of the functional form of the return
function, the feasibility correspondence can be reformulated as ¡(k;z) = fk0 2 K :
¡Á ¡ k0 · 0g and Assumption 2 will, by construction, hold.18










converges to v. Given ¹n+1(k;z), Proposition 2 asserts that this procedure reduces
to ¯nding k0 = gn+1(k;z) such that
u
0(y(k;z) ¡ k










As in the previous example, it is possible due to the concavity of the problem, to
ignore the multiplier ¹n+1 and solve the problem to ¯nd ^ gn+1. Again, the true policy
function gn+1 is recovered as gn+1 = maxf¡Á; ^ gn+1g. The multiplier can then be ob-
tained as a residual. Thus, except for a applying a \max" operator at each iteration,
such a procedure is no more di±cult to solve than a model with no constraints at all.
18Note that ¡Á in the above analysis is set strictly higher than what Aiyagari (1994) refers to
as \the natural debt limit". Here, ¡Á is what is usually referred to as an \ad-hoc constraint"; an
important feature in the current setting to ensure the boundedness of the problem. See for instance
Krusell and Smith (1997) for the empirical relevance of ad-hoc constraints.
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For a parameterization given by, ® = 0:3, ¯ = 0:95, ± = 0:1, ¾ = 1, Á = ¡2,
Z = f1;0:5g, and Q(z;z0) = 1=2 for all (z;z0) pairs, the solution is depicted in Figure
1.3. Again, Figure 1.3 illustrates how ably the procedure captures the Kuhn-Tucker
condition of ¹(k;z)m1(k;k0;z) = 0.




















Figure 1.3. Policy and multiplier for an Aiygari economy with an ad
hoc constraint (Á = ¡2).
4. Concluding Remarks
Recursive models with inequality constraints are generally problematic to solve:
Discretized Dynamic Programming su®ers severely from the curse of dimensionality
and Parameterized Dynamic Programming imposes a di®erentiability property of the
value function that might be false. Furthermore, Euler equation techniques have
unknown or very poor convergence properties, and are thus di±cult to solve without
making initial educated guesses for the equilibrium functions.
This paper has resolved parts of these problems: It has been established that
under weak conditions, the n-step value function is di®erentiable for problems with
inequality constraints. Thus, solution techniques that impose a di®erentiability of the
value function will, at least theoretically, converge to the true solution. Moreover,
through a derived analytical expression of the derivative of the value function, an iter-
ative Euler equation based method has been shown to be convergent when inequality
constraints might be present.
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Moreover, as shown in section 3, time iteration proposes an iterative procedure
that is appealing from a computational perspective. Firstly, high-dimensional ap-
proximation methods are applicable given that there is no need to approximate the
slope of any equilibrium function. Secondly, policy functions possibly have a rela-
tively uncomplicated behavior relatively to the value function and are hence more
accurately approximated. Thirdly, in the iterative procedure, Lagrange multipliers
come out as residuals from the Euler equation and these are, in the case of state
dependent constraints, merely needed to be interpolated at each iteration.
As a direction for future research, it would be desirable to establish under which
additional conditions the limiting value function is di®erentiable when inequality con-
straints potentially bind. Moreover, methods for evaluating the accuracy of numerical
solutions using the Euler equation residuals, are well developed for interior problems
(Santos, 2000). However, they are not extended to deal with problems formulated in
the context of this paper.
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1. Introduction
Between the ages of 18 and 40, an American worker can expect to be unemployed
on ¯ve di®erent occasions.1 An average spell of unemployment lasts for approximately
three months. Unsurprisingly then, unemployment is perceived as one of the greatest
economic risks an individual faces during her working life, and insurance against such
shortfalls in labor income is of high importance. Whereas most modern economies
provide unemployment insurance through a governmentally sponsored unemployment
bene¯ts programme,2 several empirical studies suggest that this is not the only source
of insurance available to the unemployed. Of the total fraction of unemployed eligible
for bene¯ts, Blank and Card (1991) estimate that only 67% take up unemployment
insurance, indicating that many of the unemployed ¯nd insurance elsewhere. Among
the group of participating individuals, Gruber (1997) ¯nds that the consumption
smoothing e®ect of insurance is particularly high at late stages of the unemployment
spell, arguing that this occurs when ¯nancial wealth is depleted. Lastly, Gruber
(1998) shows that unemployment bene¯ts have a signi¯cant crowding-out e®ect on
savings, not only suggesting that unemployment bene¯ts and wealth act as close
substitutes, but also that savings is an important factor to consider when designing
an unemployment bene¯ts programme.
Motivated by these issues, this paper develops a theoretical model in order to
characterize an optimal unemployment bene¯t programme in the presence of moral
hazard and partial self-insurance. An in¯nitely lived individual can at any date either
be employed or unemployed. While working she faces an idiosyncratic exogenous risk
of losing her job, and while unemployed she can devote time and e®ort to search
for a new job. The agent enjoys consumption and leisure, and she may reallocate
resources intertemporally by means of a riskless asset. A utilitarian government
provides unemployment insurance. It has information on the agents' consumption
1According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics' National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979
(NLSY79).
2As unemployment insurance reduces the opportunity cost of employment, it evokes substantial
moral hazard e®ects in the labor market (Meyer, 1990; Mo±tt, 1985). Private insurance solutions
are thus unlikely to function e±ciently, and may even fail to exist. As a consequence, most mod-
ern economies relies exclusively on a governmentally funded unemployment insurance programme
(Oswald, 1986; Chiu and Karni, 1998).




level and preferences, but not on their search e®ort. The government's redistribution
policy must therefore be incentive compatible.
In this setting, the government has full control over the agent's consumption and
search e®ort allocations, and may thus choose these directly. Allowing the govern-
ment to choose allocations, rather than policies, simpli¯es the problem considerably.
However, it also forces the analysis to proceed in two separate steps: The ¯rst step
characterizes the optimal allocations while the second implements these allocations
through a tax system in a decentralized economy.
I show that the government's intertemporal ¯rst order condition must observe
an inverse Euler equation (Rogerson, 1985). By Jensen's inequality, this optimality
condition implies a wedge between the agent's intertemporal marginal rate of sub-
stitution and the economy-wide interest rate (the marginal rate of transformation).
Said di®erently, in relation to a frictionless economy, the agent is saving constrained.
The reason behind this result is straightforward: In order to provide incentives to
exert search e®ort, the government wishes to generate a positive correlation between
consumption and employment. When the agent's utility function is concave, higher
savings weakens this correlation and thus decreases search e®ort. Thus, at an optimal
programme, a crowding-out e®ect of unemployment insurance on savings is indeed
desired.
Following recent developments in the dynamic public ¯nance literature, I con-
struct tax (or policy-) functions that implement the optimal allocations in a decen-
tralized economy (cf. Kocherlakota (2005); Albanesi and Sleet (2006); and Golosov
and Tsyvinski (2006)). By implement, I mean a tax system such that the solution
to a decentralized maximization problem faced by an individual agent that takes the
tax system as given, coincides with the government's optimal solution. The resulting
tax functions are simple: Current taxes depend solely on the agent's current and pre-
vious employment state, and on her level of assets. These tax functions provide new
insights into how an optimal unemployment insurance scheme should be designed:
First, the unemployment insurance policy is time-invariant, and thus independent of
the duration of the unemployment spell. Second, unemployment bene¯t payments
relate negatively to the agent's asset position: In addition to the ¯rst-order insurance
e®ect of wealth, a ceteris paribus increase in non-labor income (wealth) ampli¯es
the opportunity cost of employment and thus reduces the agent's incentive to search
for a job. Moreover, during unemployment the agent decumulates assets and the
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sequence of bene¯t payments is observationally increasing - a result that stands in
sharp contrast with previous studies (e.g. Shavell and Weiss, 1979; Hopenhayn and
Nicolini, 1997; Pavoni, 2007; Pavoni and Violante, 2007).
The essential economic mechanisms in this paper are closest related to those in
Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and Pavoni (2007). In
their seminal study, Shavell and Weiss (1979) show that consumption ought to be
decreasing with respect to the duration of the unemployment spell, a result further
con¯rmed and strengthened in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Pavoni (2007).3
Since these studies abstract from savings, the policy recommendation is immediate;
unemployment bene¯ts are given as the di®erence between consumption and labor
income, and should therefore decrease along the duration of the unemployment spell. I
deviate from this literature by relaxing two assumptions: Firstly, I model employment
and unemployment as recurrent states, while previous studies have assumed that
employment is an absorbing state. Secondly - and more importantly - I allow for
partial self-insurance by means of a riskless asset. This has salient implications for
the optimal unemployment bene¯t policy. While the consumption pattern largely
remains unaltered, the bene¯t policy does not.
In order identify the e®ect of savings and bene¯t payments on consumption, I rely
on recent developments in the dynamic public ¯nance literature. Following Kocher-
lakota (2005) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006), I consider tax systems that resemble
modern economies' combined usage of taxes and markets to reallocate resources in
the economy. Kocherlakota (2005) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006) consider dynamic
versions of Mirrleesian taxation (Mirrlees, 1971); concisely, a utilitarian government
wishes to allocate resources in an economy where skills are unobservable, but la-
bor income is not. Although the economy explored in this paper functions under
fundamentally di®erent informational frictions, the proximity of some results should
be noted. As in both Kocherlakota (2005) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006), (wealth-)
taxes and marginal taxes are period-by-period expected to be zero. Moreover, whereas
Kocherlakota (2005) puts no restrictions on the process governing the evolution of
3In fact, Pavoni (2007) ¯nds that consumption should be non-increasing: By exogenously im-
posing a minimum lower bound on the agent's present value utility - a constraint that may be
interpreted as a minimum subsistence level - the consumption sequence embeds a °at pro¯le when-
ever this constraint is binding.
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agents' skills, the resulting tax system admits a complex structure in which the tax
in any period depends upon the full history of past labor income reports. In contrast,
Albanesi and Sleet (2006) assume that the evolution of agents' skills are identically
and independently distributed over time, and show that the tax system lends itself
to a recursive representation in the agents' wealth. Although the evolution of em-
ployment status in this paper is endogenous and exhibits high persistence, the tax
system admits a simple recursive representation in the agents' wealth and current
employment status transition.
In a recent paper, Shimer and Werning (2005) consider a problem closely related to
the question explored in this paper. Similar to this paper, Shimer and Werning (2005)
¯rst consider the optimal allocations, and then, by proving an equivalence result,
derive the decentralized policy that implements these allocation . However, the two
papers show considerable di®erences: Shimer and Werning (2005) consider a version
of McCall's (1970) search model with hidden reservation wages. This paper considers
hidden search e®ort decisions. More importantly, all qualitative properties explored
in Shimer and Werning (2005) hinges on the assumption of CARA utility, and thus on
potentially negative consumption levels.4 Abstracting from some standard regulatory
conditions, this paper puts no restrictions on the speci¯c functional form of the agents'
momentary utility function.
2. Structure of the economy
The economy is populated by a utilitarian government and a continuum of risk-
averse agents. The planning horizon is in¯nite. Time is discrete and denoted by
t = 0;1;::: In any given period t, an agent can either be employed or unemployed
and the agent's employment status is publicly observable.
When an agent is employed, she earns a gross wage, w. There is no on-the-job
search and the probability of losing the job is exogenously given at the constant
hazard rate 1 ¡ °.
When unemployed, the agent receives unemployment bene¯ts and searches for a
job with e®ort e. The probability of ¯nding a job, conditional on search e®ort, is
denoted p(e). Search e®ort - and thus the probability of ¯nding a job - is considered
private information, not observable by the government or by any other agent in the
4In Shimer and Werning (2005) it is shown that their results do not extend to a setting with
CRRA utility.
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economy.5 The wage distribution is degenerate, and a job o®er is, consequently,
always accepted. The agents can save using a riskless bond that pays net pre-tax
return equal to r > 0. The intertemporal price of consumption, 1=(1+r), is denoted
by q. Savings are publicly observable.
2.1. Model. Formally, employment status in any period t is given by µt 2 £ =
f0;1g. Let µt = 1 denote employment. The history of employment status up to
period t is given by µt = (µ0;:::;µt) 2 £t, where £t = f0;1g £ f0;1g £ ::: £ f0;1g,
represent all possible histories up to period t.
At time zero, each agent is born as either employed or unemployed, and she is
entitled some level of initial cash-on-hand, b0. The initial entitlement/employment
status-pair, (b0;µ0), is taken as given by each agent in the economy (the government
included). The joint distribution of (b0;µ0) is given by Ã(b0;µ0), with support on
B £ £, where B is some subset of the real numbers, B µ R. Thus, at every date,
t, each agent is distinguished by her initial entitlements and history of employment
status, (b0;µt).
Without any loss of generality, I will henceforth formulate the problem such the
agents choose p - the probability of ¯nding a job -, rather than e®ort e, directly.
The agent then ranks contemporaneous consumption and search e®ort allocations
according an additively separable felicity function, fu(c) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)v(p)g. There is
no disutility from working.6 The function u and v are strictly increasing and once
continuously di®erentiable. In addition, u is strictly concave and v is strictly convex.
The standard Inada conditions apply for u; u0(0) = 1 and limc!1 u0(c) = 0.
An allocation in this economy is denoted ¾ = fct;ptg1
t=0, where
ct : B £ £
t ! R+
pt : B £ £
t ! [0;1]
Here, ct(b0;µt) is the amount of consumption an (b0;µ0)-agent is assigned under history
µt. The contemporaneous probability of ¯nding a job, pt(b0;µt), is de¯ned equivalently.
Let ¸(b0;µt+1) denote the probability measure for history µt+1, conditional on (b0;µ0).
For notational convenience let pt(b0;µt) be de¯ned as ° if and only if µt = 1. ¸(b0;µt+1)
5This is the source of moral hazard in the model; if bene¯t payments would be made contingent
upon search e®ort, the economy would reach its ¯rst best allocation.
6Including disutility from working would not change any of the results in the paper.
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pt(b0;µt)¸(b0;µt); µt+1 = 1
(1 ¡ pt(b0;µt))¸(b0;µt); µt+1 = 0













The utilitarian government wishes to ¯nd ¾ that maximizes the sum of net present
value utilities
















t; 8 (b0;µ0) 2 B £ £ (7)
Furthermore, since the search e®ort allocation is private information, the optimal
allocation must also respect incentive compatibility
fptg
1
t=0 = argmaxfV (¾;b0;µ0)g; 8 (b0;µ0) 2 B £ £ (8)
The motivation behind the incentive compatibility constraint is simple: Each agent
takes the consumption allocation as given and chooses search e®ort to maximize her
private utility. Without any loss of generality, the problem is organized such that
the government directly proposes a search e®ort allocation that coincides with the
agent's private optimal choice.
Constraint (7) ensures feasibility. It should be noted that this constraint will
always hold as an equality; if it did not, the government could simply increase the
agent's period zero consumption without in°icting with incentive compatibility. An
allocation that is both incentive compatible and feasible will be referred to as incentive
feasible.
Note that in (7), q is the constant intertemporal price equal to 1=(1+r). Implicitly,
this assumes that there exist an exogenous ¯nancial sector, willing to borrow and lend
at the intertemporal price q.
The following lemma states that maximizing (5) subject to individual incentive
compatibility and feasibility, is equal to solving the more complicated problem given
in (6). The result is standard and the proof is merely included for completeness.
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Lemma 2. De¯ne ¾¤ as the allocation that maximizes (5) for each (b0;µ0) 2 B££,
subject to individual incentive compatibility and feasibility. De¯ne ^ ¾¤ as the allocation
that solves (6). Then





Proof. By construction, ^ V (Ã) ¸
R
B££ V (¾¤;b0;µ0)dÃ. If the inequality was
strict, then there exist some (b0;µ0) such that V (^ ¾¤;b0;µ0) > V (¾¤;b0;µ0). Since ^ ¾¤
is incentive compatible and delivers b0, ¾¤ could not have attained the maximum in
(5). ¤
2.2. A recursive formulation. Following the insights provided by Lemma 2,
the problem of interest is given by



























Under an optimal allocation, ¾¤, equations (9) and (11) can be written as
V (b0;µ0) = u(c
¤




















The following lemma asserts that, given the budget b¤(µ1), re-optimizing the prob-
lem in period one, does not alter period zero present value utility.
Lemma 3. V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) maximizes the agent's utility subject to the budget
b¤(µ1) and incentive compatibility. That is, V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) = V (b¤(µ1);µ1).
Proof. See Appendix B. ¤
The result is not trivial. If V (b¤(µ1);µ1) > V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) for at least one µ1,
period zero incentive compatibility is violated. The idea behind the proof lies in the
fact that V (b0;µ0) is strictly increasing in b0, and that b¤(µ1) must therefore be resource
minimizing given utility V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1). The Inada conditions on u then guarantees
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that duality holds: If b¤(µ1) is resource minimizing under utility V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1),
V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) must be utility maximizing under the budget b¤(µ1).
Let be and bu denote period t+1 contingent claims in the employed and unemployed
state, respectively. Then - by exploiting the insights provided by Lemma 3 and
following the arguments outlined in Spear and Srivastava (1987) - problem (9) can
be made recursive as
V (b;µ) = max
c;p;be;bu
fu(c) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (be) + (1 ¡ p)V (bu))g (14)
subject to
p = argmaxpfu(c) ¡ µv(p) + ¯(pV (be) + (1 ¡ p)V (bu))g (15)
and
b = c ¡ µw + q(pbe + (1 ¡ p)bu) (16)
Since the function v is di®erentiable and strictly convex, the incentive compatibility
constraint (15) can be replaced by its ¯rst order condition
v
0(p) = ¯(V (be) ¡ V (bu))
The solution to (14)-(16) yields a value function, V (b;µ), associated with policy func-
tions c(b;µ), p(b;µ), be(b;µ) and bu(b;µ). When there is no confusion regarding the
agent's employment status, the policy functions will be addressed by their respective
initial letter, and reliance on b will be left implicit.
Previous studies on optimal unemployment insurance adopt a dual formulation to
the problem in (14)-(16). Speci¯cally, the literature has, without exception, followed
the cost-minimization framework commonly employed in the repeated-agency liter-
ature. Fundamentally, this approach amounts to minimize (7) such that the agent
receives a pre-speci¯ed level of present value utility, and subject to incentive com-
patibility. Due to Spear and Srivastava (1987), this dual formulation lends itself
straightforwardly to a recursive representation. In contrast, this paper adopts a pri-
mal approach. The reason for this is twofold: First, the primal formulation simpli¯es
the subsequent analysis and provides an intuitive recursive representation in terms
of (non-labor) cash-on-hand, b. Second, this way of formulating the problem has a
quite appealing and natural interpretation: Akin to a social planner, the government
maximizes the agent's utility by choosing current consumption, search e®ort, and one
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period ahead Arrow securities at prices qp and q(1¡p). By respecting incentive com-
patibility, moral hazard is internalized through individually and quantity contingently
priced assets.
3. Analysis
Consistent with the formulation of the problem in (14), the government chooses
allocations rather than policies. While it facilitates the analysis of the governments
optimal policy problem, it also restricts the subsequent analysis to proceed in two
separate steps. The ¯rst step concerns the optimal allocations. The second step
considers the tax functions that implement these allocations in a decentralized bond
economy.
Although the two steps presented above may appear distinctly separate, they are,
in e®ect, intimately related. Thus, as a third step, Section 3.3 will show how the shape
of the derived tax functions are closely tied to the incentive compatibility constraint,
and how a quite esoteric optimality condition, commonly known as the inverse Euler
equation, relate to a more familiar form of the standard Euler equation.
3.1. Allocations. Analogous to the de¯nition of be and bu, let ce and cu denote
period t + 1 consumption at the associated employment states. During employment,
moral hazard is absent and the ¯rst order necessary conditions from (14) (together











When ¯ = q, condition (17) implies that consumption is constant for any two con-
secutive periods; on a period-by-period basis, the agent is fully insured.
















00(p) = ¸q(be ¡ bu) (19)
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Where ¸ and ¹ are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget- and the incentive com-
patibility constraint, respectively.




Equation (18) is commonly known as the \inverse Euler equation" (Rogerson,






0(ce) + (1 ¡ p)u
0(cu)) (21)
Rearranging terms, equation (21) infers that there is a wedge between the agent's
marginal rate of substitution and the economy's marginal rate of transformation. In
particular, (21) implies that current marginal utility of consumption is lower than
the expected future marginal utility. In other words, the agent is savings constrained
relative to an economy with no private information. Golosov, Kocherlakota and
Tsyvinski (2003) interpret this wedge as an \implicit tax".
According to the standard Euler equation, an optimal intertemporal plan has
the property that any marginal, temporary and feasible change in behavior equates
marginal bene¯ts to marginal costs in the present and in the future. The inverse Euler
equation appears to violate this logic. For a given value of p, consider the choice of
reallocating resources from period t to period t + 1. If an increase in savings would
bring about a proportional increase in be as well as bu, equation (21) reveals that,
at least on the margin, such a policy would increase overall utility. However, the
incentive compatibility constraint in (15) does generally not permit a proportional
increase in be and bu. To keep the choice of p unaltered, the incentive compatibility
constraint forces the increase in resources to be relatively low in future states where
the marginal utility of resources is relatively high, and vice versa. Period t+1 marginal
utilities will thus be \weighted" by their respective incentive compatible in°ow of
state contingent resources. In contrast, utility maximization implies relatively high
weights of resource in°ow to states in which the marginal bene¯t of resources is
relatively high. Since incentive compatibility in°icts with period t+1 resources only,
it is thus optimal to relegate a high degree of resources to period t consumption. As
a result, the agent appears savings constrained. The inverse Euler equation is simply
the resulting expression when these con°icting forces are internalized. Section 3.3
will more algebraically con¯rm the validity of this interpretation of the inverse Euler
equation.
Lemma 4. If V (b;µ) is concave and q = ¯, then
(i) ce(b;0) > c(b;0) > cu(b;0).
(ii) c(b;1) > c(b;0).
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(iii) b > bu(b;0) > be(b;0) and bu(b;1) > b = be(b;1).
Proof. (i) Assume that cu(b;0) ¸ ce(b;0). Then from equation (19), be(b;0) ¸
bu(b;0). From (18) it is immediate that c 2 (ce;cu) and thus that bu(b;0) ¸ b. By
concavity of V , c(b;µ) is non-decreasing, and thus c(b;0) ¸ ce(b;0) ¸ c(b;1), where
the last inequality follows from be(b;0) ¸ bu(b;0) ¸ b. When µ = 1, we have that
b = be(b;1). Moreover, since c(b;0) ¸ c(b;1) = cu(b;1), b ¸ bu(b;1). Collecting
inequalities yield
be(b;0) ¸ bu(b;0) ¸ b = be(b;1) ¸ bu(b;1)
From the budget constraint, and using the fact that w > 0, this implies that c(b;1) >
c(b;0), which contradicts c(b;1) · c(b;0). Since c(b;1) · c(b;0) was a corollary of
cu(b;0) ¸ ce(b;0), we must have cu(b;0) < ce(b;0).
Claims (ii) and (iii) are immediate consequences of the proof of (i). ¤
The mechanisms underlying the proof can be seen from equation (19), in which
the utility gain/cost from a marginal increase in p is equalized. If cu > ce, the left-
hand side in equation (19) states the utility gained through a marginal increase in p.
It is a gain since a small increase in ce, accompanied with a decrease in cu, attains the
marginal change in the right-hand side of the incentive compatibility constraint (15)
necessary to accompany the change in p. Such a change provides more insurance and
thus increases utility. However, due to interiority, there is an associated utility cost;
be must be larger than bu, and an increase in p thus increase the share of the budget
spent on period t + 1 resources. The proof then proceeds by showing that cu > ce
together with bu < be, cannot be budget feasible since the wage when employed is
strictly positive.
In a two period setting, the terms be and bu in equation (19) may be replaced
by ce ¡ w and cu, respectively. The intuition behind the result in Lemma 4 is then
straightforward: To provide incentives to exert search e®ort, the government gener-
ates a positive correlation between employment and consumption, ce > cu. Insurance
is provided by a low intertemporal variance, ce > c > cu. Concavity then ensures
that this logic extends to a setting with an in¯nite planning horizon.
Remarks. The notion of Lemma 4 is equivalent to Proposition 1 in Hopenhayn and
Nicolini (1997). The proof is however substantially di®erent: Here, employment is
not an absorbing state and the problem is primal rather than dual.




In Lemma 4, concavity of V (b;µ) is assumed.7 The assumption is common in
the literature and is indispensable for the analysis (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997;
Ljungqvist and Sargent, 2004). The di±culty in proving concavity lies in the fact
that the choice set in (14) is not necessarily convex, and that (functions of) some
choice variables does not enter the Bellman equation additively.8
Previous studies on optimal unemployment insurance abstract from self-insurance
(e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Pavoni (2007)).
In the absence of savings, the policy implication from Lemma 4 is lucid; the tax/sub-
sidy policy is de¯ned as the di®erence between consumption and labor income, and
bene¯t payments should therefore decrease along the duration of an unemployment
spell. While Lemma 4 reveals that the consumption pattern remains unaltered in the
current setting with self-insurance, the unemployment bene¯t policy does not: Most
theoretical models of self-insurance (e.g. Aiyagari (1994)) display a decreasing con-
sumption pro¯le even in the absence of any unemployment bene¯t programme. It is
thus the aim of the subsequent section to characterize the policy that can implement
the optimal allocations in an economy with self-insurance.
3.2. Decentralization.
3.2.1. A ¯scal implementation. The previous section characterized the constrained
Pareto-optimal allocations attainable in the economy. This section will demonstrate
how these allocations may be attained in a setting in which the agents choose con-
sumption, search e®ort, and savings, taking the government's policy as given. The
ultimate task of this section is thus to ¯nd the tax policy such that the agents' private
choices corresponds to the optimal allocations derived above.
The agents in the decentralized economy have access to a riskless bond, a, that
pays net (pre-tax) return equal to r. At time zero, the agents enter a market economy
with a given level of cash-on-hand equal to b0. For a given tax policy, the agents
maximize their utility by choosing consumption, savings, and search processes that
ful¯ll their intertemporal budget constraint. If there is a one-to-one correspondence
7Indeed, conditions (17)-(19) are derived using Benveniste and Scheinkman's (1979) envelope
theorem - a theorem that requires concavity.
8Note that these are su±cient, but not necessary conditions for concavity. All numerical solutions
in, for instance, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) display a strictly
concave value function (or, equivalently, a strictly convex cost function).
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between the chosen processes and the optimal allocation, ¾¤, the tax allocation is
called a ¯scal implementation of ¾¤.
Formally,
Definition 2. Let b0 = a0 ¡ T0 be given. If there exist a tax allocation ^ T =
fTtg1
t=0, Tt : £t £ Rt ! R, such that fct;at+1;ptg1
t=0 solves





















t) for t = 0;1;::: (23)
and fct;ptg1
t=0 equals the optimal allocation ¾¤, then ^ T is said to be a ¯scal imple-
mentation of ¾¤.
Note that the tax allocation has a very general form. Taxes in any period t may
depend on the full history of employment as well on the full history of asset positions.
The motivation underlying this formulation is not obvious; since the agents choose
t + 1 assets using information available up to period t, it is plausible to conjecture
that taxes in t+1 will themselves only depend on information available up to period
t. However, as shown by Kocherlakota (2005), this intuition may fail; when actions
are hidden there might not exist a ¯scal implementation limited to this information
set. Section 3.3 will explore the underlying reason behind this conclusion further.
The following proposition shows that a ¯scal implementation exists and that the
resulting tax functions are simple: The tax level is recursive and contingent on the
agent's current transition and her level of wealth.
Proposition 3. There exist a time invariant tax function, Tt = T(at;µt;µt¡1),
that implements ¾¤.
Proof. The proof is direct and establishes a one-to-one relationship between the
government's and the agent's problem.




By Bellman's Principle of Optimality, the government's problem in (14)-(16) can
be split up as
V (b;µ) = max
c;³
fu(c) + X(³;µ)g
s.t. b = c ¡ µw + q³
X(³;µ) = max
p;be;bu
f¡(1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (be) + (1 ¡ p)V (bu))g
s.t. v
0(p) = ¯(V (be) ¡ V (bu))
³ = pbe + (1 ¡ p)bu




f¡(1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (³ ¡ Te(³;µ)) + (1 ¡ p)V (³ ¡ Tu(³;µ)))g
Thus,




f¡(1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (³ ¡ Te(³;µ)) + (1 ¡ p)V (³ ¡ Tu(³;µ)))gg
= max
c;³;p
fu(c) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (³ ¡ Te(³;µ)) + (1 ¡ p)V (³ ¡ Tu(³;µ)))g
s.t. b = c ¡ µw + q³
Where the last equality follows, again, from the Principle of Optimality. By con-
struction, if a0 = ³, the above Bellman equation is the recursive formulation of the
decentralized problem given in De¯nition 2. ¤
The above proposition hinges upon an important assumption: As in Kocherlakota
(2005) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006), I assume that the ¯scal implementation is such
that the optimal allocation is \a®ordable". A®ordability means that if the agent had
the possibility to buy the optimal allocation, she would period-by-period a®ord it.
That is,
wµt + at ¡ Tt = ct + q(ptbe;t+1 + (1 ¡ pt)bu;t+1)
This restriction is crucial for separating the e®ect of savings and taxes on consump-
tion. A®ordability implies that the government's state variable, bt, must equal the
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agent's non-labor cash-on-hand at ¡ Tt. As a consequence, taxes are strictly redis-
tributive
at+1 = (pt(at+1 ¡ Te;t+1) + (1 ¡ pt)(at+1 ¡ Tu;t+1)) (24)
By Lemma 4, it is thus immediate that bu;t+1 > at+1 > be;t+1. The agent is conse-
quently positively taxed when employed and negatively taxed when unemployed (or
equivalently, receiving an unemployment bene¯t).
When savings and taxes are identi¯ed as above, the intuition underlying Proposi-
tion 3 is quite straightforward. Bellman's Principle of Optimality reveals that savings,
a0, is a su±cient state variable for the choice of be, bu and p. The tax functions are
then de¯ned as the di®erence between savings and the optimal t + 1 non-labor cash-
on-hand, be and bu. By the design of the tax function, the agent can always choose
the assigned allocation. Any other feasible choice amounts to imitating the t + 1
allocation of some other agent. By construction, imitating someone else is incentive
compatible and budget feasible. Thus, since the allocation is optimal under incentive
compatibility and budget feasibility, imitation cannot be optimal.
The tax functions in Proposition 3 are recursive in an agent's wealth, her cur-
rent and previous employment state. Akin to the tax functions that map savings to
state contingent cash-on-hand, functions be(b;µ) and bu(b;µ) map period t resources
to period t+1 state contingent cash-on-hand. Why, then, could the tax functions not
be recursive in (b;µ)? Inasmuch the optimal allocation still would be attainable for
an agent operating in the decentralized economy, choosing the allocation would no
longer be optimal: Imitating someone else is feasible, but not incentive compatible.
By the same logic underlying the inverse Euler equation, the agent would, then, in-
crease savings to equalize equation (21), violating the incentive compatibility of the
optimal allocation.
Remarks. There is a continuum of tax systems that may implement any incentive fea-
sible allocation. To appreciate this, consider an arbitrary incentive feasible allocation
at time t. The agent consumes c and she exerted search e®ort in the previous period
inducing p¡1. Her asset position and unemployment bene¯t handouts equal a and ¿,
respectively. Then another allocation with a0 = a + ², ¿0 = ¿ ¡ ² and c0 = c, is still
incentive compatible, feasible, and generates the same level of utility to the agent for
any real value of ". At one extreme, 100% wealth- and labor taxes with lump-sum
transfers equal to consumption, would indeed implement any allocation. Arguably,




such a tax system is quite draconian and does not resemble the combined usage of
taxes and markets to reallocate resources observed in most current economies. At
another extreme, zero taxes and individually and quantitative-contingently priced
Arrow securities could be designed to exactly mimic the problem in (14)-(16). While
perhaps elegant, and by construction optimal, such a market arrangement requires an
elaborate pricing system relying on common knowledge of individual asset positions
and preferences.
Ruling out such elaborate asset structures and focusing on the one bond scenario,
one may, alternatively, view the problem of indeterminacy as a question regarding
savings. Speci¯cally, it is a question regarding whether it is the government, or the
agent (or any combination of the two), that carries out the intertemporal allocations
of resources. Of course, inasmuch there are a continuum of possible arrangement of
storage, one may legitimately wonder on what basis one can rationally chose between
those arrangements. As in Kocherlakota (2005) and Albanesi and Sleet (2006), this
paper imposes two assumptions in order to identify the e®ect of self-insurance from
taxes/bene¯ts on consumption. First, agents save using a riskless bond. The presence
of a riskless bond can be thought of as a parsimonious representation of a more elab-
orate underlying diversi¯ed portfolio choice (at the intertemporal price q). Second,
the optimal allocation is assumed to be period-by-period a®ordable. Fundamentally
this assumes that all intertemporal transfers of resources are actualized by the agents'
savings. This identi¯cation scheme guarantees to attain the optimal allocation with
minimal governmental interference.9
3.2.2. Characterization. While taxes has been shown to have a simple recursive
representation, so far little has been shown regarding their properties. Examining the
qualitative properties of the tax function T corresponds to examine how T = a ¡ b
responds to a change in a. To this end, I will derive and exploit the properties of the
marginal tax functions.
This section will state the main results, supported by brief comments. In the sub-
sequent section, I will relate the results presented here to properties of a \weighted"
Euler equation, and, in turn, relate this equation to the inverse Euler equation. For
clarity of exposition, focus is put on the case (of interest) at µ = 0. To facilitate
9Allowing the government to intertemporally allocate resources using her own storage technology,
however subject to some \iceberg cost", would endogenously identify savings, and thus taxes, as in
the current setting.
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notation, let Te(a0) and Tu(a0) denote period t+1 taxes at the associated employment
states at µ = 0.




0) = 1 ¡
u0(cu)




0) = 1 ¡
u0(ce)
pu0(cu) + (1 ¡ p)u0(ce)
Proof. See Appendix B. ¤
The idea behind the proof is to consider an in¯nitesimal change in a0. The resulting
marginal change in taxes must be such that the government's ¯rst order conditions
hold, incentive compatibility is preserved and the budget balances. In addition, the

























0) = 1 ¡
qu0(c)
¯u0(cu)
If ¯ = q, and since ce > c > cu, it is evident that T 0
e(a0) < 0 and 1 > T 0
u(a0) > 0.
Thus, both unemployment bene¯ts and \reemployment taxes" are decreasing with the
agents asset position.
Corollary 1. Marginal taxes are expected to be zero.
Proof. When the agent is unemployed Proposition 4 together with the inverse
Euler equation (18), gives the result.
When the agent is employed, taxes satis¯es a0 = °(a0¡Te(a0))+(1¡°)(a0¡Tu(a0)).
If taxes are di®erentiable, the derivative of this expression with respect to a0 gives the
result. ¤
Zero expected marginal taxes are not particularly surprising in this setting; by
the construction of the tax functions, taxes are always expected to be zero. A ceteris
paribus change in savings mimics the action taken by some other agent and taxes
respond accordingly.
The main part of the literature on optimal unemployment insurance has concluded
that bene¯t payments ought to decrease along the duration of unemployment. The
result is intuitive; in the absence of savings, a decreasing bene¯t pro¯le induces a




decreasing consumption pro¯le, providing both insurance as well as su±cient search
e®ort incentives. Abstracting from savings, Lemma 4 con¯rms this result. Neverthe-
less, Proposition 3 shows that this result does not immediately generalize to a setting
in which partial self-insurance is present: The tax policy is time-invariant and thus
independent of the duration of the unemployment spell. In addition, the following
proposition reveals that the intuition supporting a decreasing bene¯t pro¯le fails in
the current setting. Indeed, along the duration of the unemployment spell, the agent
will decumulate assets and the sequence of unemployment bene¯ts will observationally
be increasing.
Proposition 5. If V (b;µ) is concave and ¯ = q, then (i) a > a0, (ii) Tu(a) >
Tu(a0), and (iii) Te(a) < Te(a0).
Proof. By Proposition 4, 1 > T 0
u(a0) > 0. Thus for any a1 and a2, such that
a1 > a2, Tu(a1) > Tu(a2). If a0 ¸ a, 1 > T 0
u(a0) implies that bu ¸ b, which contradicts
Lemma 4, part (iii). Thus a > a0, Tu(a) > Tu(a0) and, by Proposition 4, Te(a) <
Te(a0). ¤
The result is intuitive. During unemployment, the agent exploits the insurance
e®ect of savings by decumulating assets. Proposition 4 infers that unemployment
taxes are positively related to the agent's asset position. Thus, as the agent's level of
assets decline, so does the level of the tax. Since unemployment taxes are negative
this implies that unemployment bene¯ts will increase.
Accompanied with the inverse Euler equation, Proposition 5 has an intuitive ex-
planation. First, wealth has a ¯rst order insurance e®ect. The higher is an agent's
wealth, the less she needs to worry about loss of consumption if she loses her job.
Second, in order to provide incentives to exert search e®ort, the government wishes
to generate a positive correlation between consumption and employment. When the
agent's utility function is concave, a higher level of savings makes it costlier for the
government to induce such a correlation and the agent's search e®ort decreases. By
generating a negative correlation between savings and unemployment bene¯ts, the
government manages to mitigate the distortionary e®ect of savings on search.
3.3. The Euler equation, taxes, and the inverse Euler equation. I now
provide a deeper intuition underlying some of the results presented in the preceding
sections. To this end I will consider an equivalent version of the government's problem
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in which the sole choice is strictly intertemporal, and not state contingent. It will
be shown how this problem formulation leads to a \weighted Euler equation", and
further how these weights relate to marginal taxes. At the optimum, the weighted
Euler equation implies the inverse Euler equation.
The inverse Euler equation can be thought of as the outcome when savings are
chosen to balance two con°icting forces: To maximize utility, resources should be
allocated to where the marginal bene¯t of resources is relatively high. For incentive
compatibility, resources should be allocated to states in which the marginal bene¯t
of resources is relatively low. Since incentive compatibility in°icts with period t + 1
resources only, it is thus optimal relegate a relatively high degree of resources to
period t consumption. As a result, the agent appears savings constrained.
For a given value of savings, it is instructive to think of the optimal division of
period t+1 resources across employment states as functions ful¯lling two restrictions:
The incentive compatibility constraint and the budget constraint. Similar to the tax
functions explored in the previous section, these functions then allocate, for a given
level of savings, resources to the di®erent employment states. Let the government
choose savings, a0, and let the functions ±e(a0) and ±u(a0) allocate resources between
employment states such that the budget is balanced and incentive compatibility holds.
That is, for a given p, a0 = p±e(a0)+(1¡p)±u(a0) and v0(p) = ¯(V (±e(a0))¡V (±u(a0))).
The government then faces the following intertemporal maximization problem
V (b) = max
a0 fu(b ¡ qa
0) + ¯(pV (±e(a
0)) + (1 ¡ p)V (±u(a
0)))g















Equation (25) resembles a standard Euler equation, and has an interpretation in
terms of marginal intertemporal trade-o®s: The utility cost of an marginal increase
in savings equals its feasible marginal utility gain. As with standard intertemporal
problems, the t+1 feasible marginal utility gain is determined by the feasible in°ow of
resources in period t+1 - a marginal decrease of period t consumption is accompanied
by a proportional marginal increase of period t+1 resources, weighted by the interest
rate: 1 = p±0
e(a0) + (1 ¡ p)±0
u(a0). In addition, however, there is a further restriction
on how the period t + 1 resources must be divided between employment states. In
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One can combine this marginal incentive compatibility constraint with the \marginal












pV 0(bu) + (1 ¡ p)V 0(be)
(27)
The expressions above reveals an important feature: Whenever V 0(bu) > V 0(be),
±0
e(a0) > ±0
u(a0), and vice versa. That is, for states in which the marginal value of
resources is relatively high, the marginal in°ow of resources should be relatively low.
Substituting the relationship in (27) into (25) gives the inverse Euler equation.
It is important to note that the functions in (27) are directly related to the mar-
ginal taxes derived in Proposition 4. In particular, ±0(a0) = 1 ¡ T 0(a0). The intuition
underlying the shape of the tax function then becomes evident: For a certain choice
of p to remain incentive compatible, an increase in savings must be divided between
employment states such that the incentive compatibility constraint holds. That is,
the in°ow of resources must be relatively high at states in which the marginal value
of resources is relatively low. By Lemma 4, the marginal value of resources is high
in the unemployed state, and the additional in°ow must therefore be low. Since the
optimal policy is recursive in an agent's wealth, a higher level of assets must induce
a lower level of unemployment bene¯ts.
Additionally, the marginal incentive compatibility constraint in (26) illuminates
the answer to a further inquiry explored in the literature (e.g. Kocherlakota (2005),
Section 3): As savings are chosen on the basis of information available in period t,
could period t + 1 taxes be a function of period t information only? That is, could
±0
e(a0) equal ±0
u(a0)? From equation (26) it is straightforward to see that this cannot
be the case. In order for incentive compatibility to hold, period t + 1 taxes can only
be a function of period t information if (and only if) V 0(be) = V 0(bu), or, equivalently,
if ce = cu. Under all other circumstances, a tax contingent on period t information
only would, with certainty, violate the incentive compatibility constraint.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied a model of optimal redistribution policies in which the
foremost risk in an agent's life is unemployment. Moral hazard arises as job search
Rendahl, Pontus (2007) Essays in Recursive Macroeconomics 
European University Institute
 
10.2870/2215150 2. ASSET BASED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
e®ort is unobservable. The model permits agents to self-insure by means of a riskless
bond.
In contrast with previous studies in the literature, it is shown that the optimal
unemployment insurance policy does not display any duration dependence. Whereas
wealth encodes the agents' relevant employment status history, the insurance policy
is time-invariant and, instead, contingent on the agents' asset position. In order to
induce job search e®ort, the government wishes to provide a positive correlation be-
tween consumption and employment status. Since a higher level of savings reduces
the correlation, unemployment bene¯ts relate negatively to wealth. The agents decu-
mulates assets over the unemployment spell in order to exploit the intrinsic insurance
e®ect of wealth. Thus, the sequence of bene¯t payments is, observationally, increasing
with the duration of unemployment.
The policy implications from the analysis are stark; unemployment bene¯ts should
be asset based and relate negatively to wealth. As wealth itself encodes insurance pos-
sibilities, the negative relation between wealth and unemployment bene¯ts is intuitive.
However, asset based approaches have commonly been criticized for its distortive, and
negative, e®ect on savings (e.g. Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), Gruber (1998)).
Although undesirable per se, this paper has revealed an additional e®ect of wealth;
a higher level of savings reduces the opportunity cost of being employed and thus
increases the unemployment duration. Together, the net distortive e®ect of an asset
based scheme appears to be favorable.
There are several ways in which an asset based unemployment insurance pro-
gramme could be accomplished. As with Medicaid, food stamps, and until recently,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), to mention a few social policies
in the United States, unemployment bene¯ts may be asset based means tested; that
is, unemployment bene¯ts are paid only if an agent has assets below a speci¯ed max-
imum amount. Alternatively, and obviously, schemes may be more elaborate with a
continuous decline in bene¯t payments as assets increases.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines how the presence of liquidity constraints a®ects the proper-
ties of optimal unemployment insurance provisions in a model of job-search, moral
hazard and partial self-insurance. I show that the optimal unemployment insurance
scheme is recursive in an agent's asset position and her current employment transi-
tion. Unemployment bene¯ts are decreasing with the agent's wealth level, and they
are constant whenever the liquidity constraint is binding - a result markedly in con-
trast with previous studies in which bene¯t payments displays a declining pattern
along the duration of the unemployment spell (e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979), and
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997)). In calibrated version of the model it is shown that
the e®ect of the liquidity constraint is quantitatively important: A constrained agent
with zero liquid wealth ought to receive bene¯ts payments three times higher than
that received by an agent with wealth equal to one months labor income; twenty
times higher than that received by an agent with wealth equal to three months labor
income; and one hundred times higher compared to an agent with savings equal to
twelve months of labor income (US median labor income to wealth ratio). The rea-
son behind this swift increase in bene¯t payment along the wealth dimension is that
optimal insurance provision should replace a missing market - the market for credits.
A large and growing literature has studied optimal unemployment insurance poli-
cies in models in which agents' search e®orts are private information (e.g. Shavell and
Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and Pavoni (2007)). The conclusion
from this literature is that unemployment bene¯ts should be a decreasing function
of the duration of unemployment, as this declining bene¯t pro¯le allows the govern-
ment to provide agents with incentives to undertake job search. It is common in this
literature to neglect means of self-insurance and, therefore, the presence of liquidity
constraints. Yet, several empirical studies have documented that self-insurance, and
indeed, liquidity constraints, are important factors to consider when designing an un-
employment bene¯ts programme. Blank and Card (1991), for instance, calculate that
only 67% of those eligible for unemployment insurance indeed take up unemployment
bene¯ts, indicating that a large fraction of the unemployed ¯nd insurance elsewhere.
Gruber (1998) ¯nds that unemployment bene¯ts have a signi¯cant crowding-out e®ect
on savings, suggesting that wealth and unemployment bene¯ts act as close substitute.
Browning and Crossley (2001) concludes that nearly half of job losers in the United




States report zero liquid wealth at the time of job loss, suggesting that liquidity is a
concern for many of the unemployed, and Gruber (1997) ¯nds that the consumption
smoothing e®ect of insurance is particularly high at late stages of the unemployment
spell, arguing that this occurs when ¯nancial wealth is depleted. Moreover, Chetty
(2007) divides the unemployed into subgroups based on how likely they are to be
liquidity constrained. He ¯nds that while the e®ect of unemployment bene¯ts on
the hazard rate of reemployment is extremely small for the unconstrained, the cor-
responding measure for the constrained group is severe.1 Chetty (2007) concludes
that for liquidity constrained individuals, unemployment bene¯ts replaces a missing
credit market, and thus conveys a substantial, and undistortionary, wealth e®ect on
the reemployment hazard rate.
The model adopted in this paper follows closely Shavell and Weiss (1979), and
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), extended with limited self-insurance: An in¯nitely
lived individual can at any date either be employed or unemployed. While working
she faces an idiosyncratic exogenous risk of losing her job, and while unemployed she
can devote time and e®ort to search for a new job. The agent enjoys consumption
and leisure, and she may reallocate resources intertemporally by means of a riskless
asset. When doing so, the agent is subject to a liquidity constraint.
The utilitarian government has information on the agents' consumption level and
preferences, but not on their search e®ort. The redistribution policy must therefor
be incentive compatible. Akin to a social planner that respects incentive compatibil-
ity, the government has full control over the agents' consumption and search e®ort
allocations, and may choose these directly. However - following Kocherlakota (2005)
and Albanesi and Sleet (2006) - the government does not command any storage tech-
nology of her own.
2 Thus, any intertemporal reallocation of resources is obtained
through the agents' savings, and must therefore respect the liquidity constraint. By
1Speci¯cally, Chetty (2007) measure the elasticity of the hazard rate of reemployment on un-
employment bene¯ts. He ¯nds that this elasticity is close to zero for the wealthiest 50% of the
unemployed, while the corresponding elasticity for the 50% poorest equals approximately ¡0:7; in-
dicating that roughly 70% of the unemployment insurance/duration link is caused by a wealth e®ect,
due to the presence of a liquidity constraint.
2Kocherlakota (2005), and Albanesi and Sleet (2006) assume that all transfers of resources across
time is actualized by the agents' private savings. This is equivalent to assuming that the government
operates no storage technology of her own.
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carefully \buying and selling" contingent claims, however, the government Pareto-
improves on the intertemporal allocation by intratemporally reallocating resources
across employment states.
For an unemployed and unconstrained agent, the government's intertemporal op-
timality conditions, the inverse Euler equation, implies a wedge between the agent's
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and the economy-wide real interest rate
(the marginal rate of transformation). The reason is that in order to provide incen-
tives to exert search e®ort, the government wishes to generate a positive correlation
between consumption and employment. When the agent's utility function is concave,
higher savings weakens this correlation and thus decreases search e®ort. In contrast,
when the agent is liquidity constrained, a Lagrange multiplier enters into the intertem-
poral optimality condition. The presence of the multiplier implies that savings and
consumption are constant between any two consecutive periods of unemployment.
Following recent developments in the dynamic public ¯nance literature, I construct
tax functions that implement the optimal allocations in a decentralized economy (cf.
Kocherlakota (2005), and Albanesi and Sleet (2006)). By implement, I mean a tax
system such that when taken as given, the solution to a decentralized maximization
problem faced by an individual coincides with the government's optimal solution. In
addition to an agent's current and previous employment state, the resulting tax policy
is recursive in the agent's wealth. As a consequence, a liquidity constrained agent's
unemployment bene¯ts are constant over the course of unemployment.
2. Structure of the economy
The economy is populated by a utilitarian government and a continuum of risk-
averse agents. The planning horizon is in¯nite. Time is discrete and denoted by
t = 0;1;::: At any given period t, an agent can either be employed or unemployed
and the agent's employment status is publicly observable.
When an agent is employed, she earns a gross wage, w. There is no on-the-job
search and the probability of being ¯red is exogenously given at the constant hazard
rate 1 ¡ °.
When unemployed, the agent receives unemployment bene¯ts and searches for a
job with e®ort e. The probability of ¯nding a job, conditional on search e®ort, is
denoted p(e). Search e®ort - and thus the probability of ¯nding a job - is considered
private information, not observable by the government or by any other agent in the
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economy.3 The wage distribution is degenerate, and a job o®er is, consequently,
always accepted. The agents save using a riskless bond that pays net pre-tax return
equal to r > 0. The intertemporal price of consumption, 1=(1+r), is denoted q. Bond
holdings, a, are subject to a liquidity constraint, Á, such that for any t, at ¸ Á. It
should be noted that this liquidity constraint is imposed rather than derived from any
additional assumptions on private information in the credit market. Indeed, savings
are publicly observable. Several studies have found wide empirical support on the
view that restricted borrowing is a reality for the vast majority of household, and
has, ever since the seminal paper by Deaton (1991), been a standard ingredient in
several theoretical models explaining consumption and savings behavior.4
2.1. Model. An agent's employment status in any period t is given by µt 2 £ =
f0;1g. Let µt = 1 denote employment. The history of employment status up to
period t is given by µt = (µ0;:::;µt) 2 £t, where £t = f0;1g £ f0;1g £ ::: £ f0;1g,
represent all possible histories up to period t.
At time zero, each agent is born as either employed or unemployed, and she is
entitled some level of initial cash-on-hand, b0. The initial entitlement/employment
status-pair, (b0;µ0), is taken as given by each agent in the economy (the government
included). The joint distribution of (b0;µ0) is given by Ã(b0;µ0), with support on
B £ £, where B is some subset of the real numbers, B µ R. Thus, at every date,
t, each agent is distinguished by her initial entitlements and history of employment
status, (b0;µt).
Without any loss of generality, I will henceforth formulate the problem such the
agents choose p - the probability of ¯nding a job - rather than e®ort e. The agent
then ranks contemporaneous consumption and search e®ort allocations according an
additively separable felicity function, fu(c)¡(1¡µ)v(p)g. There is no disutility from
working.5 The function u is strictly concave, strictly increasing, and once continu-
ously di®erentiable. The function v is strictly convex, strictly increasing, and twice
continuously di®erentiable. In addition, limp!0 v0(p) = 0 and limp!1 v0(p) = 1.
3This is the source of moral hazard in the model; if bene¯t payments would be made contingent
upon search e®ort, the economy would reach its ¯rst best allocation.
4For empirical evidence, see, for instance, Zeldes (1989).
5Including disutility from working would not change any of the results in the paper.
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An allocation in this economy is denoted ¾ = fct;ptg1
t=0, where
ct : B £ £
t ! R+
pt : B £ £
t ! [0;1]
Here, ct(b0;µt) is the amount of consumption an (b0;µ0)-agent is assigned under history
µt. The contemporaneous probability of ¯nding a job, pt(b0;µt), is de¯ned equivalently.
Let ¸(b0;µt+1) denote the probability measure for history µt+1, conditional on (b0;µ0).
For notational convenience let pt(b0;µt) be de¯ned as ° if and only if µt = 1. ¸(b0;µt+1)




pt(b0;µt)¸(b0;µt); µt+1 = 1
(1 ¡ pt(b0;µt))¸(b0;µt); µt+1 = 0













The utilitarian government wishes to ¯nd ¾ that maximizes the sum of net present
value utilities
















t; 8 (b0;µ0) 2 B £ £ (30)
Furthermore, since the search e®ort allocation is private information, the optimal
allocation must respect incentive compatibility
fptg
1
t=0 = argmaxfV (¾;b0;µ0)g; 8 (b0;µ0) 2 B £ £ (31)
The motivation behind the incentive compatibility constraint is simple: Each agent
takes the consumption allocation as given and chooses search e®ort to maximize her
private utility. Without any loss of generality, the problem is formulated such that
the government directly proposes a search e®ort allocation that coincides with the
agent's private optimal choice.
Before formally introducing the agents' liquidity constraint into the government's
problem, it is useful to discuss the relationship between allocations and bond holdings.
It is instructive, for the time being, to consider an allocation in a two period version
of the above problem: In period zero, an (b0;µ0)-type agent will exert search e®ort p
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and consume c. In period one she consumes c(1) if employed and c(0) if unemployed.
The measure of (b0;µ0)-agents in state µ1 = 1 and µ1 = 0 must then equal p and
1 ¡ p, respectively. The total amount of resources transferred from period zero to
period one thus equals p(c(1) ¡ w) + (1 ¡ p)c(0). As in Albanesi and Sleet (2006)
and Kocherlakota (2005), I will henceforth assume that the total amount of resources
transferred between period zero and period one for an (b0;µ0)-agent equals that agent's
savings.
Generalizing the above discussion to an in¯nite horizon setting gives the following
assumption
















Note that the budget constraint in (30) above may be rewritten as
b0 ¸ c0(b0;µ












0) ¡ µ0w + qa1(b0;µ
0)
That is, at period t, the agent spends his resources bt on current consumption, ct,
and reallocates resources to period t + 1 by means of the riskfree bond, at+1. The
government then faces the additional liquidity constraint
at+1(b0;µ
t) ¸ Á; 8 (b0;µ
t) 2 B £ £
t (32)
The liquidity constraint in (32) is exogenously imposed, and represents a reduced
form presumption that agents are unwilling to lend out resources to asset poor indi-
viduals. Exogenous liquidity constraints is common in the literature of optimal social
policies, and is deployed since it captures the e®ect of credit market imperfections in
a parsimonious manner.6
It should be noted that constraint (30) together with the liquidity constraint en-
sures feasibility. Constraint (30) will always hold as an equality; if it did not, the
6See for instance Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), Gomes, Greenwood and Rebelo (2001), Ab-
dulkadiro¸ glu, Kuru» s» cu and Sahin (2002), and Wang and Williamson (2002).
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government could simply increase the agent's period zero consumption without inter-
fering with neither incentive compatibility nor the liquidity constraint. An allocation
that is both incentive compatible and feasible will be referred to as incentive feasible.
The following lemma states that maximizing (28) subject to the individual budget
constraint, incentive compatibility and the liquidity constraint, is equal to solving
the more complicated problem given in (29). The result is standard and the proof is
merely included for completeness.
Lemma 5. De¯ne ¾¤ as the allocation that maximizes (28) for each (b0;µ0) 2 B£
£, subject to individual incentive compatibility, feasibility and the liquidity constraint.
De¯ne ^ ¾¤ as the allocation that solves (29). Then





Proof. By construction, ^ V (Ã) ¸
R
B££ V (¾¤;b0;µ0)dÃ. If the inequality was
strict, then there exist some (b0;µ0) such that V (^ ¾¤;b0;µ0) > V (¾¤;b0;µ0). Since ^ ¾¤
is incentive compatible, delivers b0, and satis¯es the liquidity constraint, ¾¤ could not
have attained the maximum in (28). ¤
2.2. A recursive formulation. Following the insights provided by Lemma 5,
the problem of interest is given by







































t+s; 8 t (36)
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Under an optimal allocation, ¾¤, equations (33), (35) and (36) can be written as
V (b0;µ0) = u(c
¤



























The following lemma asserts that, given the budget b¤(µ1), re-optimizing the prob-
lem in period one, does not alter period zero present value utility.
Lemma 6. If u(0) = ¡1, then V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) in (37), maximizes the agent's
utility subject to the budget b¤(µ1), the liquidity constraint, and incentive compatibility.
That is, V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) = V (b¤(µ1);µ1).
Proof. See Appendix C. ¤
In a companion paper, Rendahl (2007), the above problem is analyzed in the ab-
sence of liquidity constraints. While the presence of the constraint complicates the
proof, and indeed necessitates additional assumptions, the underlying idea is similar:
Since V (b0;µ0) is strictly increasing in b0, b¤(µ1) can be shown to be resource minimiz-
ing given utility V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1). The proof then proceed by showing that duality
holds: If b¤(µ1) is resource minimizing under utility V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1), V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1)
must be utility maximizing under the budget b¤(µ1).
Let be and bu denote period t+1 contingent claims in the employed and unemployed
state, respectively. Then - by exploiting the insights provided by Lemma 6 and
following the arguments outlined in Spear and Srivastava (1987) - problem (33) can
be made recursive as
V (b;µ) = max
c;p;be;bu
fu(c) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (be) + (1 ¡ p)V (bu))g (40)
subject to
p = argmaxpfu(c) ¡ µv(p) + ¯(pV (be) + (1 ¡ p)V (bu))g (41)
and
b = c ¡ µw + q(pbe + (1 ¡ p)bu) (42)
and
0 ¸ Á ¡ pbe ¡ (1 ¡ p)bu (43)
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In accordance with Assumption 4, pbe + (1 ¡ p)bu equals savings.
Since the function v is di®erentiable and strictly convex, the incentive compati-
bility constraint (41) can be replaced by its ¯rst order condition
v
0(p) = ¯(V (be) ¡ V (bu))
The solution to (40)-(42) yields a value function, V (b;µ), associated with policy func-
tions c(b;µ), p(b;µ), be(b;µ) and bu(b;µ). When there is no confusion regarding the
agent's employment status, the policy functions will be addressed by their respective
initial letter, and reliance on b will be left implicit.
Previous studies on optimal unemployment insurance adopt a dual formulation
to the problem in (40)-(42). Speci¯cally, the literature has, without exception, fol-
lowed the cost-minimization framework commonly employed in the repeated-agency
literature. Fundamentally, this approach amounts to minimize (30) such that the
agent receives a pre-speci¯ed level of present value utility, and subject to incentive
compatibility. Due to Spear and Srivastava (1987), this dual formulation lends itself
straightforwardly to a recursive representation. In contrast, this paper adopts a pri-
mal approach. The reason for this is twofold: First, the primal formulation simpli¯es
the subsequent analysis and provides an intuitive recursive representation in terms
of (non-labor) cash-on-hand, b. Second, this way of formulating the problem has a
quite appealing and natural interpretation: Akin to a social planner, the government
maximizes the agent's utility by choosing current consumption, search e®ort, and one
period ahead Arrow securities at prices qp and q(1¡p). By respecting incentive com-
patibility, moral hazard is internalized through individually and quantity contingently
priced assets.
3. Analysis
Consistent with the formulation of the problem in (40), the government chooses
allocations rather than policies. While it facilitates the analysis of the governments
optimal policy, it also restricts the subsequent analysis to proceed in two separate
steps. The ¯rst step concerns the optimal allocations. The second step considers tax
functions that implement these allocations.
3.1. Allocations. Analogous to the de¯nition of be and bu, let ce and cu denote
period t + 1 consumption at the associated employment states. During employment,




moral hazard is absent and the ¯rst order necessary conditions of (40) (together with
the envelope condition) gives
u








0(cu); ¹ ¸ 0 (44)
Condition (44) implies that when ¹ = 0, consumption is constant for any two con-
secutive periods; on a period to period basis, the agent is fully insured. When ¹ > 0,
consumption at t + 1 is higher than consumption at t. However, consumption is still
constant across states, ce = cu.
For an unemployed agent, it is instructive to consider the following partition of
the problem given in (40)-(43)
V (b;µ) = max
c;a0 fu(c) + X(a
0;µ)g (45)
s.t. b = c ¡ µw + qa
0 (46)





f¡v(p) + ¯(pV (be) + (1 ¡ p)V (bu))g (48)
s.t. v
0(p) = ¯(V (be) ¡ V (bu)) (49)
a
0 ¸ pbe + (1 ¡ p)bu (50)
As previously mentioned, V is strictly increasing. It is important to note that X is
strictly increasing as well. This is formally proved in the appendix, but can more
easily be seen from the following argument (Golosov et al., 2003): Suppose that (50)
is an inequality. Then for some (su±ciently small) ", the planner may increase be
and bu with "=V 0(ce) and "=V 0(cu), respectively. At the resulting allocation, p is
unchanged and lifetime utility has increased by ¯".














; ¹ ¸ 0 (51)
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When ¹ = 0, equation (51) is the commonly known as the \inverse Euler equation"






0(ce) + (1 ¡ p)u
0(cu)) (53)
Rearranging terms, equation (53) suggests that there is a wedge between the agent's
marginal rate of substitution and the economy's marginal rate of transformation.
Note that the inequality is such that, absent agency problems, the agent would wish
to increase future expected consumption at the expense of lower current consumption.
In other words, the optimal allocation implies that the agent is savings constrained.
According to the standard Euler equation, an optimal plan has the property that
any marginal, temporary and feasible change in behavior equates marginal bene¯ts
to marginal costs in the present and future. The inverse Euler equation appears to
violate this logic. For a given value of p, consider the optimal choice of reallocating
resources from period t to period t + 1. If an increase in savings would bring about
a proportional increase in be as well as bu, equation (53) reveals that, at least on the
margin, such a policy would increase overall utility. However, the incentive compat-
ibility constraint in (41) does generally not permit a proportional increase in be and
bu. To keep the choice of p unaltered, this constraint forces the increase in resources
to be relatively low in states where the momentum (or for small changes, marginal
utility) of resources is high, and vice versa. The period t + 1 marginal utilities will
thus be \weighted" by their respective in°ow of state contingent resources such that
the incentive compatibility constraint holds. These weights are high at states in which
the marginal utility is low. In contrast, utility maximization implies relatively high
weights in states where the marginal bene¯ts of resources is relatively high. Since
incentive compatibility in°icts with period t + 1 resources only, it is thus optimal to
relegate a relatively high degree of resources to period t consumption. As a result,
the agent appears \savings constrained". The inverse Euler equation is simply the re-
sulting expression when these con°icting forces are internalized (see Rendahl (2007),
Section 3.3, for an algebraic argument revealing the same logic).
The proof for the following lemma may be found in Rendahl (2007), and is there-
fore omitted.
Lemma 7. If X(a;µ) is concave, q = ¯, and ¹ = 0, then
(i) c(b;1) > c(b;0)




(ii) ce(b;0) > c(b;0) > cu(b;0)
(iii) b > bu(b;0) > be(b;0) and bu(b;1) > b = be(b;1)
The lemma states two important facts: First, for a given level of cash on hand,
consumption when employed is always strictly higher than consumption when unem-
ployed. Second, consumption is decreasing between any two consecutive periods of
unemployment. In a two period setting, the intuition underlying part (ii) in Lemma
7 is lucid. The terms be and bu in equation (52) may then be replaced by ce ¡ w and
cu, respectively. In order to provide incentives to exert search e®ort, the government
then generates a positive correlation between employment and consumption, ce > cu.
Insurance is provided by a low intertemporal variance, ce > c > cu. Concavity ensures
that this logic extends to a setting with an in¯nite planning horizon.
Proposition 6. If X(a;µ) is concave and q = ¯ there exist an interval [b;b],
such that for any b 2 [b;b], a0(b;0) = Á and bu(Á;0) = b.
Proof. Let µ = 0 be implicit throughout the proof. Note that concavity of X
implies strict concavity of V . From the ¯rst order conditions of (45)-(47), a0(b) is
strictly increasing in b when ¹ = 0. By the Maximum Theorem, a0(b) is a continuous
function (Stokey et al., 1989). Thus there exist a b such that a0(b) = Á and ¹ = 0.
By Lemma 7, b > bu(Á). Now, consider a b 2 (b;bu(Á)]. The proposition claims
that a0(b) = Á and that ¹ > 0. Assume the opposite; that is, a0(b) ¸ Á and ¹ = 0.
Then by the ¯rst order conditions of (45)-(47) and concavity of X, a0(b) ¸ a0(b)
and c(b) ¸ c(b). By the budget constraint in (46), this implies that b ¸ b which
contradicts b 2 (b;bu(Á)]. Thus for any two b;b0 2 [b;bu(Á)], a0(b) = a0(b0) = Á and
b = bu(Á). ¤
The intuition underlying the proposition is straightforward: If the constraint is
binding at a certain b, then it is binding for any b0 < b. The policy function from
(48)-(50) is denoted bu(a0). Since for any binding b, a0 is by de¯nition equal to Á. As
long as b is a binding value, bu is independent of b. Thus, bu(Á) is the lowest possible
value of b and a0(b) = Á at b = bu(Á).
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Remarks. In Lemma 7 and Proposition 6, concavity of X(a;µ) is assumed.7 The
assumption is quite drastic but indispensable for the analysis. The di±culty in proving
concavity lies in the fact that the choice set in (48)-(50) is not necessarily convex,
and that (functions of) some choice variables do not enter the Bellman equation
additively.
8
3.2. A ¯scal implementation. Assumption 4 asserts that an agent's private
savings equals the intertemporal transfer of resources between any two consecutive
periods. The assumption identi¯es how the agent's liquidity constraint can be intro-
duced into a problem where a government chooses allocations rather than policies.
Thus, as Assumption 4 identi¯es savings, it also identi¯es the government's policy:
Taxes (and, obviously, unemployment bene¯ts) are simply given as the residual be-








It will in this section be shown that given these taxes, the optimal allocation will, in
fact, be chosen by an agent operating in a decentralized economy.
Each agent in the decentralized economy have access to a riskless bond, a, that
pays net (pre-tax) return equal to r. At time zero, the agents enter a market economy
with a given stock of non-contingent claims equal to b0. Treating the tax system in
(54) as given, the agents maximize their lifetime utility by choosing consumption,
savings, and search processes respecting the liquidity and the intertemporal budget
constraint.
Formally,
Definition 3. Let the tax allocation T : R £ f0;1g £ f0;1g ! R, and initial
cash-on-hand b0 be given. The decentralized economy is then given by















7Indeed, conditions (44), (51) and (52) are derived using Benveniste and Scheinkman's (1979)
envelope theorem - a theorem that requires concavity of V . Concavity of X is su±cient for this.
8Note that these are su±cient, but not necessary conditions for concavity. All numerical solutions
in this paper as well as in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) displays a strictly concave value function.












t) ¸ Á; for t = 0;1;2;::: (57)
The following proposition shows that given the tax functions in (54), the solution
to (55)-(57) coincides with the optimal allocation
Proposition 7. The solution to (55)-(57) coincides with the solution to (40)-
(43).
Proof. The proof is direct and establishes a one-to-one relationship between the
government's and the agent's problem.





f¡(1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (a
0 ¡ Te(a




V (b;µ) = max
c;a0 fu(c) + max
p
f¡(1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (a
0 ¡ Te(a





fu(c) ¡ (1 ¡ µ)v(p) + ¯(pV (a
0 ¡ Te(a
0;µ)) + (1 ¡ p)V (a
0 ¡ Tu(a
0;µ)))g
s.t. b = c ¡ µw + qa
0; and a
0 ¸ Á
Which is the recursive form of the problem given in (55)-(57). ¤
The intuition behind this result is immediate. By the design of the tax function,
the agent can always choose the assigned allocation. Any other choice is equal to
imitate the allocation of some other agent. By construction, imitating someone else
is incentive compatible and budget feasible. Thus, since the allocation is optimal
under incentive compatibility and budget feasibility, imitation cannot be optimal.
3.3. Unemployment bene¯ts and the duration of unemployment. In this
section I will analyze the qualitative properties of an optimal unemployment insurance
program during the course of unemployment. When an unemployed agent is uncon-
strained, consumption is decreasing, the agent decumulates assets, and the sequence
of unemployment bene¯ts displays an increasing pro¯le. As was shown in Lemma 7,
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consumption should decrease along the duration of the unemployment spell in order
to provide incentives to search. The agent chooses to decumulate assets along the
unemployment spell in order to exploit the intrinsic insurance e®ect of wealth. Un-
employment bene¯ts displays an increasing pro¯le for two reasons: First, a higher
level of non-labor income (from wealth) reduces the correlation between employment
and consumption. An increasing bene¯t payments structure thus intentionally crowds
out savings in order to render search incentives. Second, an increasing bene¯ts pro¯le
enhance the role of bene¯ts as insurance for those who deplete their wealth as a con-
sequence of being unemployed for long periods. Moreover, when the agent is liquidity
constrained, consumption, savings and unemployment bene¯ts are all constant. By
Proposition 6, a0(b) = Á and bu(Á) = b. By the construction of the tax function it is
immediate that cash-on-hand, as well as unemployment bene¯ts, are constant. Since
cash-on-hand stays constant, so does consumption.
Examining the qualitative properties of the unemployment bene¯ts corresponds
to examine how the tax function in (54) responds to a change in a0. This is a non-
trivial task; taxes and wealth must interact in a course such that the solutions to the
problems (33) and (55) coincide. To this end, I will examine the properties of the
marginal tax functions.
Let Te(a0) and Tu(a0) denote period t + 1 taxes at the associated employment
states, and at µ = 0. The following proposition reveals that the tax functions are
di®erentiable

















Proof. See Appendix C. ¤
The idea behind the proof is to consider an in¯nitesimal change in a0. The resulting
marginal change in taxes must be such that the government's ¯rst order conditions
hold, incentive compatibility is preserved, the budget balances, and the de¯nition of
the tax functions hold. In addition, the agent's decentralized ¯rst order conditions
must hold:
u
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The qualitative features of the unemployment insurance program depends on the
sign of these marginal tax functions. When the liquidity constraint is not binding, the
result is straightforward; if ¯ = q, then ce > c > cu and T 0
e < 0 and T 0
u > 0. Thus, for
an unconstrained agent, unemployment bene¯ts are decreasing with wealth. De¯ne c
as c(b;0). For any b in the binding interval [b;b], de¯ne c as c(b;0). Then from the
¯rst order conditions, ¹(b;0) = u0(c) ¡ u0(c). Thus, for all b 2 [b;b], the marginal tax

















Since ce and cu was optimal when c was chosen, ce > c > cu. Again it follows that
T 0
e < 0 and T 0
u > 0.
Proposition 9. If X(a0;µ) is concave, ¯ = q, and ¹ = 0, then (i) a ¸ a0, (ii)
Tu(a) > Tu(a0), and (iii) Te(a) < Te(a0).
Proof. By Proposition 8 and Lemma 7, 1 > T 0
u(a0) > 0. Thus for any a1 and a2,
such that a1 > a2, Tu(a1) > Tu(a2). If a0 > a, then 1 > T 0
u(a0) implies that bu > b,
thus contradicting Lemma 7 and Proposition 6. Thus a > a0, Tu(a) > Tu(a0), and
Te(a) < Te(a0). ¤
Thus, when ¹ = 0, Lemma 7 gives that c > cu. Proposition 9 reveals that a > a0
and that Tu(a) > Tu(a0).
When ¹ > 0 and b = b, Proposition 6 reveals that a0(b) = Á and bu(Á) = b.
Thus a = a0 = Á and b = bu = b. By the construction of the tax functions in (54),
unemployment bene¯ts are constant and equal b ¡ Á.
4. Quantitative Analysis
To shed further light on the properties of the optimal unemployment insurance
program, I turn to a calibrated version of the model. The aim of this section is
to answer the following question: Should a liquidity constrained agent be treated
signi¯cantly di®erent from an unconstrained agent?
As will be shown, an unconstrained agent with savings equal to three months of
labor income (su±cient to sustain a labor income loss equal to an average unemploy-
ment spell), ought to receive a ¯rst-period replacement rate of 1:5%, to be compared
with the 30% received by a liquidity constrained agent with zero liquid wealth. This
result gives support for a asset based means tested unemployment insurance scheme.
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4.1. Calibration. Following the main macroeconomic literature the function u





The coe±cient of risk-aversion ¾ is set to 2.9 As in Pavoni (2007) and Pavoni and
Violante (2007), the length of each period is assumed to be one month. The yearly
interest rate is set at 5% and the intertemporal discount factor ¯ is thus 1:05¡1=12. In
order for the results to be comparable with the previous (contractual) literature on
unemployment insurance, the hazard rate of unemployment, 1 ¡ °, is set to zero.10
Employment is thus an absorbing state. The net wage, w, is normalized to 1.








Note that v is strictly convex on [0;1] and that v(0) = 0, v0(0) = 0 v(1) = 1 and
v0(1) = 1. Several articles on optimal unemployment insurance (e.g Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (1997), Young (2004) and Wang and Williamson (2002)), assume that
p(e) = 1 ¡ exp(¡®e) and that the disutility of search equals e. A choice consistent
with the literature would thus be v(p) = ¡ln(1¡p)=®. To ensure interiority, however,
the above simple modi¯cation is employed.
In line with previous research on unemployment insurance, the liquidity constraint
Á is set to zero (e.g. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), Wang and Williamson (2002),
Abdulkadiro¸ glu et al. (2002), and Young (2004)). Borrowing is thus not permitted.
To calibrate the parameter ® in the function v, an auxiliary economy is used. The
auxiliary economy is given as the problem in equations (55)-(57), but in which the
government's policy, T, is exogenously speci¯ed. As in Wang and Williamson (2002)
and Young (2004), the ¯xed unemployment insurance policy delivers unemployment
bene¯ts equal to 50% of labor income for the ¯rst six months of unemployment,
and 17% thereafter. Taxes when employed are assumed to be constant and levied
on labor income. The income tax is endogenous as to balance the government's
budget. The parameter ® is then set to match the elasticity of the hazard rate of
9Estimates show that this parameter is genrally within the range [1;3] (Mehra and Prescott,
1985).
10That is, Shavell and Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Pavoni (2007) and Pavoni
and Violante (2007).
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employment with respect to unemployment bene¯ts given in Chetty (2007). Under
this calibration ® is set to 0:4 and generates an elasticity equal to ¡0:46 for liquidity
constrained individuals, and ¡0:25 for individuals with savings equal to one year of
labor income.11
Table 1 summarizes the baseline parameter calibration.
Table 3.1. Calibration of Parameters
Parameter ¯ ¾ r 1 ¡ ° w ® Á
Value 1:04¡ 1
12 2 5% 0 1 .4 0
4.2. Numerical Results. Figure 3.1 depicts how the level of unemployment
bene¯ts are related to an agent's asset position. The agent's wealth is featured on
the horizontal axis. Wealth ranges from zero to the US median labor income to
wealth ratio (which is, on yearly basis, equal to one). The vertical axis displays
the level of unemployment bene¯ts as a fraction of the wage. The ¯gure reveals an


























Figure 3.1. Unemployment bene¯ts and wealth.
illuminating pattern; unemployment bene¯ts for the asset poor ought to be several
orders of magnitude of that of a wealthy agent. For instance, unemployment bene¯ts
paid to an agent with wealth equal to three month labor income (enough to sustain
11The corresponding numbers in Chetty (2007) roughly equal ¡:7 and +:2. However, since it is
impossible for the current model to generate a positive elasticity, these numbers cannot be targeted
exactly.The numbers generated in this calibration are thus a compromise somewhere in between
Chetty's (2007) estimates.
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an average unemployment spell) is 5% of that paid to a borrowing constrained agent.
The equivalent ¯gure for an agent with wealth equal to the US median labor income
to wealth ratio (i.e 12) is :6%.
The relationship featured in Figure 3.1 is sensitive to the calibration of the coef-
¯cient of relative risk aversion, ¾, and the degree of moral hazard, ®. For instance,
at ¾ = 3 and ® = :8 (high risk aversion, moderate moral hazard), a borrowing con-
strained agent ought to receive a replacement rate of 50%. At ¾ = :5 and ® = :2
(low risk aversion, severe moral hazard) the corresponding number drops to 7%. The
intuition is not far fetched; a higher degree of risk aversion unequivocally generates a
higher provision of insurance. When moral hazard is moderate, high insurance comes
at a low cost (in terms of distortion to incentives). However, Table 3.2 reveals that
the relationship between unemployment bene¯ts paid at di®erent wealth level conveys
a more robust pattern. Even at a high degree of risk aversion and a modest degree of
moral hazard, unemployment bene¯ts should decrease swiftly with the agent's wealth
level; at wealth equal to one month of labor income, unemployment bene¯ts ought to
be 40% of the bene¯ts received by a constrained agent with zero wealth.
Table 3.2. Relative Unemployment Bene¯tsa
Values of Parameters ¾ and ®
Wealth f3;:8g f1:5;:4g f:5;:2g
0 100% 100% 100%
1 40% 27% 20%
2 15% 10% 9%
3 7% 5% 4%
12 3% 1% 0%
aThe ratios are calculated as the unemployment bene¯ts received at the respective
wealth level, divided by bene¯ts paid to a liquidity constrained individual at zero
wealth.
Figure 3.2 corresponds to Proposition 9 and depicts the sequence of consumption
(upper solid line), decumulation of assets (dashed line), and unemployment bene-
¯ts received along the course of unemployment. Decumulation of assets is de¯ned
as at+1 ¡ at. As in Proposition 9, unemployment bene¯ts are increasing when the
agent is unconstrained. This increasing pro¯le is targeted at crowding out savings
in order to provide incentives to exert search e®ort. Recall that the government
provides incentives by letting consumption covary positively with employment. A
higher level of savings reduces this correlation and thus aggravates the duration of
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Figure 3.2. The sequence of consumption (upper solid line), decu-
mulation of assets (dashed line), and unemployment bene¯ts along the
duration of unemployment.
unemployment. The net e®ect is a decreasing sequence of cash-on-hand and, thus, a
decreasing sequence of consumption. When the liquidity constraint binds, the level
of unemployment insurance peaks, and stays constant.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper has studied a model of optimal redistribution policies in which the
foremost risk in an agent's life is unemployment. Moral hazard arises as job search
e®ort is unobservable. Whereas the model permits agents to self insure by means of
a riskless bond, borrowing is exogenously restricted.
Previous studies on unemployment insurance - e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979),
Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and Pavoni (2007) - assume that whereas each agent
is borrowing constrained, the government operates her own storage technology where
any such restriction is absent. As a consequence, the government saves (and borrows)
in an agent's name, e®ectively relieving the agent of any impediment caused by the
liquidity constraint. In contrast, this paper has taken a di®erent position: A liquidity
constraint is here an exogenously imposed presumption that agents are unwilling to
lend resources to agents with savings lower than a pre-speci¯ed threshold. Although
the government may function as a ¯nancial intermediary, she is not able to fend o®
the lending loath imposed by the liquidity constraint.
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The optimal unemployment insurance scheme reveals two illuminating features:
First, unemployment bene¯ts ought to be constant for liquidity constrained agents.
Since a liquidity constrained agent's situation (or state) does not change over the
course of unemployment, the optimal program does not embed any duration depen-
dence. Second, in a calibrated version of of the model it was shown that the liquidity
constraint conveys important quantitative implications. A constrained agent ought
to receive bene¯ts payments three times higher than that received by an agent with
wealth equal to one months labor income; twenty times higher than that received by
an agent with wealth equal to three months labor income; and one hundred times
higher compared to an agent with savings equal to twelve months of labor income
(US median labor income to wealth ratio).
The policy implications from the analysis are stark; unemployment bene¯ts should
be asset based and depend negatively on the agent's asset position. As wealth itself
encodes insurance, the negative relation between wealth and unemployment bene¯ts
is intuitive. However, asset based approaches have commonly been criticized for its
distortive, and negative, e®ect on savings (e.g. Hubbard et al. (1995)). Although
undesirable per se, this paper has revealed an additional e®ect of wealth; a higher
level of savings reduces the opportunity cost of being employed and thus increases the
unemployment duration. Together, the net distortive e®ect of an asset based scheme
appears to be favorable.
The optimal program in this paper displays a continuous, and negative, relation-
ship between assets and unemployment bene¯ts. Such a continuous relationship may
be very costly to implement in practice. Nevertheless, the (very) steep decline in
bene¯ts along the wealth dimension does indicate that an asset based means tested
insurance program may be close to optimal: As with Medicaid, food stamps, and
until recently, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), to mention a few
social policies in the United States, unemployment bene¯ts may be paid only if an
agent has assets below some threshold.
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A. Code for Chapter 1.
1 % The neoclassical growth model with irreversible investment
2 % in the setting of Christiano and Fischer (2000), model (1),
3 % solved by the method of endogenous gridpoints using a finite
4 % element method (linear interpolation is default).
5
6 % Parameters: exp(z) is the solow residual, a is the capital share
7 % of output, b is the discount factor, d is the depreciation
8 % rate and g is the coefficient of relative riskaversion.
9 % Z is the exogenous state space with associated transition
10 % matrix, Q.
11
12 %N defines the number of nodes in the endogenous state space.
13
14 N=200; p=0; z=0.23; a=0.3; b=1.03ˆ(¡1/4); d=0.02; g=1;
15 Q=[(1+p)/2,(1¡p)/2;(1¡p)/2,(1+p)/2]; Z=exp([z;¡z]);
16
17 n=ones(size(Z')); nn=ones(N,1); d1=0.5;
18 khat=((1¡b*(1¡d))/(a*b))ˆ(1/(a¡1)); kmax=khat*1.9; kmin=khat*0.3;
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B. Proofs of Chapter 2
Lemma 3.
Proof. Equations (12) and (13) are repeated for convenience:
V (b0;µ0) = u(c¤










The proof proceeds in three steps: First it will be shown that for any utility maximizing or re-
source minimizing allocation, the Inada-conditions on u(c) implies that if ct(b0;µt) = 0, then
ct+s(b0;µt+s) = 0, for s 2 N, almost surely. Second, focusing on the interior case, it will then be
shown that b¤(µ1), as given in equation (B2), is resource minimizing under the value V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1).
Third it will be shown that duality holds; that is if b¤(µ1) is resource minimizing under V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1),
then V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) is utility maximizing under b¤(µ1) - that is, V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) = V (b¤(µ1);µ1).
Step 1. For any utility maximizing or resource minimizing allocation, de¯ne ±(b0;µt) as
±(b0;µt) = u(ct) ¡ v(pt) + ¯(ptu(c1
t+1) + (1 ¡ pt)u(c0
t+1))
The dependency of ct, pt and ct+1, on (b0;µt) and (b0;(µt;µt+1)) is here left implicit. Assume that
¸(b0;µt) > 0. Consider the following problem
max
x;z;y
fy ¡ q(px + (1 ¡ p)z)g
s.t. ±(b0;µt) = u(ct ¡ y) ¡ v(pt) + ¯(ptu(c1
t+1 + x) + (1 ¡ pt)u(c0
t+1 + z))
u(c1
t+1 + x) ¡ u(c0
t+1 + z) = u(c1
t+1) ¡ u(c0
t+1)
ct ¸ y; c1
t+1 ¸ ¡x; c0
t+1 ¸ ¡z
where the allocation fct;ptg1
t=0 is incentive feasible. At the optimal allocation, the solution to the
above problem is given by x = y = z = 0. To see why, notice that any deviation of x, y, and z
from zero, ful¯lling the above restrictions, is feasible and incentive compatible. Moreover, such a
perturbation frees up period t resources equal to y ¡ q(px + (1 ¡ p)z). These additional resources
may, if properly discounted, be allocated as period zero consumption - or, in a resource minimizing
setting, as less period zero resources - without in°icting with incentive compatibility.
Assume that ct = 0. Then the ¯rst order necessary conditions to the above problem with respect

















Since u0(0) = 1, c1
t+1 must also equal zero whenever pt > 0. The same holds for c0
t+1 whenever
(1¡pt) > 0. Thus if ct(b0;µt) = 0 for any µt with ¸(b0;µt) > 0, then ct+s(b0;µt+s) = 0, ¸(b0;µt+s)-a.s.




Step 2. Consider the following resource minimization problem:














fu(ct(V; ^ µt)) ¡ (1 ¡ ^ µt)v(pt(V; ^ µt))g¸(V; ^ µt)d^ µt (B5)
and subject to the incentive compatibility constraint. A \hat" on the sequence µt is used to distin-
guish it from the values of µt in the original problem (9)-(11). If the constraint in (B5) is non-binding,
then c0 = 0 and, by Step 1. above, ct(V;µt) = 0 8 µt. I will henceforth refer to this solution as the
zero solution. It is important to note that a non-zero solution attains at least as high utility as the
zero solution; at any non-zero solution, the agent could exert the same search e®ort as at the zero
solution (which is zero), and attain a strictly higher level of utility. Thus, independently of c0 being
interior, constraint (B5) must hold as an equality.
Assume that V in (B5) equals V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) in (B1). Assume further that µ1 = ^ µ0. Could
b(V; ^ µ0) in (B4) take on a smaller value than b¤(µ1) in (B2)? If so, V (b(V; ^ µ0);µ1) = V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1)
8 µ1 2 £, and b(V; ^ µ0) < b¤(µ1) for at least one value of µ1. At this alternative allocation, p¤
0 is still
incentive compatible and
V (b0;µ0) = u(c¤




V (b(V; ^ µ0);µ1)¸(b0;µ1)dµ1
b0 > c¤




Where the last inequality together with monotonicity of V (b0;µ0) implies thus that ¾¤ could not
have attained the maximum in (9).
Step 3. In order to complete the proof, it must be shown that V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1) attains the
maximum value under resources b¤(µ1).
Assume that V (b¤(µ1);µ1) > V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1). By Berge's Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis and
Border, 1999), V (b¤(µ1);µ1) is continuous in b. Since any non-zero solution renders greater utility
than the zero solution, c1(b¤(µ1);µ1) > 0, and there exist a b¤¤(µ1) arbitrarily close to b¤(µ1) such that
b¤(µ1) > b¤¤(µ1) and V (b¤¤(µ1);µ1) > V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1). This contradicts that b¤(µ1) was resource
minimizing for V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1). Thus V (b¤(µ1);µ1) = V (¾¤;b¤(µ1);µ1). ¤
Proposition 4.
Proof. The proof is direct and derives the implied marginal taxes from an in¯nitesimal change
in assets.
By construction, the equilibrium tax functions satis¯es
a0 = p(a0)(a0 ¡ Te(a0)) + (1 ¡ p(a))(a0 ¡ Tu(a0))
Thus, if the tax functions are di®erentiable, the following must hold for the marginal tax
p0(a0)(Tu(a0) ¡ Te(a0)) = pT0
e(a0) + (1 ¡ p)T0
u(a0) (B6)
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From the incentive compatibility constraint we have
v00(p)p0(a0) = ¯(V 0
e(a0)(1 ¡ T0
e(a0)) ¡ V 0
u(a0)(1 ¡ T0
u(a0))) (B7)
Substituting the relationships be = a0 ¡Te(a0) and bu = a0 ¡Tu(a0) into (19) (the government's ¯rst
order condition for p) gives




Where ¸ and ¹ are the multipliers on the budget and incentive compatibility constraint, respectively.





e(a0) + (1 ¡ p)T 0
u(a0) (B9)
Substituting (B7) into (B9)
¯(V 0
e(a0)(1 ¡ T0






e(a0) + (1 ¡ p)T0
u(a0) (B10)





e(a0)) + (1 ¡ p)u0(cu)(1 ¡ T0
u(a0))) (B11)
Using equation (18) and solving equations (B10) and (B11) yields
T0
e(a0) = 1 ¡
u0(cu)
pu0(cu) + (1 ¡ p)u0(ce)
; T 0
u(a0) = 1 ¡
u0(ce)
pu0(cu) + (1 ¡ p)u0(ce)
¤




C. Proofs of Chapter 3
Lemma 6.
Proof. By the Principle of Optimality, the problem in (33)-(36) can be split up as
V (b0;µ0) = max
c0;a1
fu(c0) ¡ µ0v(p0) + X(a1;µ0)g (C1)
s.t. b0 = c0 ¡ µ0w + qa1 (C2)








fu(ct(a1;µt)) ¡ (1 ¡ µt)v(pt(a1;µt))g¸(a1;µt)dµt (C4)
s.t. fptg1







fct(a1;µt) ¡ µtwg¸(a1;µt)dµt (C6)









dµt+s; for t = 1;2;::: (C7)










The proof then proceeds in three steps. The ¯rst step shows that X(a1;µ0) is strictly increasing
in a1. By exploiting this fact, the second step will then proceed by showing that b¤(a1;µ1) must
be resource minimizing under promised utility V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1). Lastly, the third step then
shows that duality holds: If b¤(a1;µ1) is resource minimizing under utility V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1), then
V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1) must be utility maximizing under resources b¤(a1;µ1).
Step 1. Assume that there is an in°ow of resources to the left-hand side of (C6) equal to
" > 0. For notational convenience, de¯ne c1 and c0 as period one consumption in the employed and
unemployed state respectively. Pick an "1 ¸ 0 and "0 ¸ 0 such that
u(c1 + "1) ¡ u(c0 + "0) = u(c1) ¡ u(c0)
"1 + "0 = "
Since the relative value between employment states are unaltered, p¤
0(a1;µ0) is still incentive com-
patible and period zero expected utility has increased by
¯(p0(u(c1 + "1) ¡ u(c1)) + (1 ¡ p0)(u(c0 + "0) ¡ u(c0))) > 0
Where p0 = p¤
0(a1;µ0).
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Step 2. Consider the following resource minimization problem:














fu(ct(V; ^ µt)) ¡ (1 ¡ ^ µt)v(pt(V; ^ µt))g¸(V; ^ µt)d^ µt (C11)
and subject to the incentive compatibility and liquidity constraint. A \hat" on the sequence µt is
used to distinguish it from the values of µt in the original problem (33)-(36). It is important to
note if constraint (C11) in problem (C10)-(C11) is slack, then c0(V; ^ µ0) is interior; if it was not,
since u(0) = ¡1, the right-hand side in (C11) would equal minus in¯nity, and V ¸ ¡1. It is
then straightforward to see that constraint (C11) will hold as an equality. If it did not, period zero
consumption could simply be reduced without interfering with neither incentive compatibility nor
the liquidity constraint, reducing the objective function.
Now, consider the scenario in which ^ µ0 = µ1 and V = V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1). Could b(V; ^ µ0) in
(C10) be smaller than b¤(a1;µ1), for at least one value of µ1? Assume that it is. De¯ne a0
1 as
a0
1 = p0(a1;µ0)b(V;1)+(1¡p0(a1;µ0))b(V;0), and note that a1 > a0
1, and that a0
1 is budget feasible,
incentive compatible and delivers utility V (b0;µ0). a0
1 might not, however, respect the time zero
liquidity constraint. Pick an a00
1 such that a1 > a00
1 > a0
1. Then, since X(a0
1;µ0) is strictly increasing
and continuous (Aliprantis and Border, 1999), X(a00
1;µ0) > X(a1;µ0), which violates the optimality
of V (b0;µ0). Thus, b¤(a1;µ1) is resource minimizing under promised utility V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1).
Step 3. In order to complete the proof, it must be shown that V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1) attains the
maximum value under resources b¤(a1;µ1).
Assume that V (b¤(a1;µ1);µ1) > V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1). By Berge's Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis
and Border, 1999), V (b¤(a1;µ1);µ1) is continuous in b. By the same argument as above, c1(b¤(a1;µ1);µ1) >
0 since u(0) = ¡1. Thus there exist a b¤¤(a1;µ1) arbitrarily close to b¤(a1;µ1) such that b¤(a1;µ1) >
b¤¤(a1;µ1) and V (b¤¤(a1;µ1);µ1) > V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1). This contradicts that b¤(a1;µ1) was resource
minimizing for V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1). Thus V (b¤(a1;µ1);µ1) = V (¾¤;b¤(a1;µ1);µ1). ¤
Proposition 8.
Proof. The proof is direct and derives the implied marginal taxes from an in¯nitesimal change
in assets.
By construction, the equilibrium tax functions satis¯es
a0 = p(a0)(a0 ¡ Te(a0)) + (1 ¡ p(a))(a0 ¡ Tu(a0))
Thus, if the tax functions are di®erentiable, the following must hold for the marginal tax
p0(a0)(Tu(a0) ¡ Te(a0)) = pT0
e(a0) + (1 ¡ p)T0
u(a0) (C12)
From the incentive compatibility constraint we have
v00(p)p0(a0) = ¯(V 0
e(a0)(1 ¡ T0
e(a0)) ¡ V 0
u(a0)(1 ¡ T0
u(a0))) (C13)




Substituting the relationships be = a0 ¡Te(a0) and bu = a0 ¡Tu(a0) into (52) (the government's ¯rst
order condition for p) gives
q(Tu(a0) ¡ Te(a0)) = ³v00(p) (C14)
Where ³ is the ratio of the multipliers on the budget and incentive compatibility constraint, respec-
tively. Elementary algebra shows that ³ = p(1 ¡ p)(1=u0(cu) ¡ 1=u0(ce)). Substituting (C14) into
(C12)
p0(a0)v00(p)³ = pT0
e(a0) + (1 ¡ p)T0
u(a0) (C15)





e(a0)) ¡ V 0
u(a0)(1 ¡ T0
u(a0)))³ = pT0
e(a0) + (1 ¡ p)T0
u(a0) (C16)
In addition, the agent's decentralized ¯rst order condition must hold:




e(a0)) + (1 ¡ p)u0(cu)(1 ¡ T0
u(a0))) (C17)
Using equation (51) and solving equations (C16) and (C17) yields
T0
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